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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Over the past decades, academic researchers have become increasingly fascinated with 
the growing number of cooperative ties that firms create with each other. While much of the 
previous studies has focused on competitive dynamics, scholars are progressively redirecting 
their attention to the dynamics of cooperation. Decision makers belonging to manufacturing 
and services industries recognize the importance of cooperation switching from pure 
competition to coopetition (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996). Big corporations like 
Motorola, Siemens, American Airlines and Toyota have all recognized the importance of 
collaborating to compete.  
 There are many options through which a firm can partner with another. One of fastest 
growing sets of interorganizational ties is represented by strategic alliances that firms enter to 
achieve a common goal. Among the various definitions of strategic alliances I choose the one 
provided by Das and Teng (2000: 33) who define them as “voluntary cooperative inter-firm 
agreements aimed at achieving competitive advantage for partners”. Given the broad 
definitions of strategic alliances provided by previous studies, including the one I have 
chosen, it may be complex to define which agreement can be classified as strategic and which 
not. To give a more precise definition of the scope of inter-firm relationships I follow the 
classification provided by Yoshino and Rangan (1995). Figure 1 provides an overview of the 
range of interorganizational relationships that can be categorized as strategic alliances. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
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 One of the reasons why strategic alliances have become so popular is their flexible 
nature. Strategic alliances lie at the heart of the make or buy continuum. In other words they 
could be seen as a compromise between the excessive costs and time required for an organic 
growth and the complexity and high capital requirements for mergers and acquisitions. For 
this reason strategic alliances have been frequently considered as an engagement between two 
companies whereas a merger is typically considered as a marriage. Just as an engagement 
between two individuals, strategic alliances can be the premise of a deeper future cooperation 
which may turn into a merger, or marriage to use the previous metaphor. However, during the 
alliance phase, the two companies will have time to explore if they are fit to each other and if 
the outcome of the cooperation does not meet the initial target, the relationship may terminate 
with smaller damages than in the case of a merger or acquisition. It has been recently 
estimated that many of the world’s largest companies had over 20% of their assets tied up in 
alliances (Ernst, 2004). According to a study made by Partner Alliances, over 80% of Fortune 
1000 CEOs believed that alliances would account for almost 26% of the companies’ revenues 
in 2007-08 (Kale, Singh, & Bell, 2009). Despite those numbers, alliance failure rates range 
between 60 and 70% (Hughes & Weiss, 2007). To solve this paradox, practitioners and 
scholars have elaborated a series of tools and “recipes” such as creating a solid business plan 
backed up by a detailed contract or defining metrics for assessing the value the alliance 
delivers.  
 Besides these relevant aspects, I believe there is one important problem characterizing 
most, if not all, companies engaging in multiple alliances: the focus on single dyads. It is not 
rare to observe within a company the absence of a specific function dedicated to alliance 
management with alliances being managed at the corporate level with the support of mid-
level managers in finance or marketing departments. This may increase even more the 
complexity of managing a broad set of alliances leading to a myopia that hinders the firm’s 
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ability to fully exploit the interdependencies between each dyadic tie. In my view, the 
adoption of a holistic approach toward alliance management could maximize the benefits the 
firm can accrue from its portfolio of alliances. The portfolio metaphor refers to a firm’s 
collection of direct alliances with partners. It is akin to the notion of the egocentric network, 
which encompasses the focal firm (ego), its set of partners (alters), and their connecting ties 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The fact that a firm may have a great number of ties suggests 
that it has to simultaneously manage this portfolio and address potentially conflicting 
demands from multiple partners (Gulati, 2007). Accordingly, it may be reasonable to argue 
that competition has progressively moved from one-to-one competition to competition 
between ego networks and to competition between groups of ego networks. Recent examples 
of this pattern can be found in airlines, automobiles, telecommunications, and computers. In 
the airline industry for instance, in order to overcome regulatory barriers and share costs 
while increasing market coverage, airlines have teamed up by building alliance groups that 
compete with each other. Gomes-Casseres has been one the first scholars to argue that the 
competitive game is often transformed from firm versus firm to group versus group. He 
coined the term constellation to describe a set of firms linked together through alliances and 
that competes in a particular competitive domain (Gomes-Casseres, 1996).  
 Although the focus may have switched from more micro to more macro levels, 
research on inter-firm relationships has curiously been for its most part cross-sectional. 
Furthermore, there has been a more or less implicit assumption of stability in the majority of 
these studies. A recent special issue appearing on Organization Science edited by Ahuja, 
Soda, and Zaheer (2011) has specifically tackled some of the above issues. These scholars 
raise some important questions concerning the validity of previous research highlighting the 
positional and relational benefits of networks. For example, we know that actors that span 
structural holes can use their position to benefit themselves as they trade information, favors, 
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and the like. But this raises the natural question of why structural holes remain unfilled. What 
happens as other players in a network observe the returns to network entrepreneurship of the 
sort envisaged most famously in Burt’s work (Ahuja et al., 2011: 1024)? These considerations 
suggest that in order to have a better understanding of the emergence and evolution of 
interorganizational networks, we need to formulate and test hypotheses using longitudinal 
datasets. In an effort to do so, my thesis provides an important contribution to the alliances 
and networks literature by explicitly surpassing the static view on alliance networks. 
 The adoption of an evolutionary approach implies that networks change over time 
through the creation and/or dissolution of ties. In this regard, it is necessary to understand the 
determinants of these changes (antecedents) and the impact they may have on a company’s 
performance (consequences). Although in recent years some progress has been made in 
understanding the dynamics of networks, for the most part scholars have focused on the 
endogenous influence of network structure to explain the evolution of networks. In its most 
prominent exposition, an evolutionary view of networks has emphasized network structure as 
its own context for evolution (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). Minor contributions are therefore 
taking into account exogenous factors. The combination of focusing almost exclusively on the 
endogenous influence of network structure on network change and the assumption of 
equilibrium have led scholars to underestimate the importance of studying the impact of 
factors exogenous to the network (e.g. environmental changes) and situations far from 
equilibrium. My study is one of the very first attempts to do so and thus provides a valuable 
contribution to the small but growing research on network change.   
 To study how disruptions stemming from the external environment influence network 
behavior and its performance consequences, I introduce the concept of environmental jolt. 
The first scholar to explicitly address situations far from equilibrium by using the term 
environmental jolt is Meyer (1982) in his seminal study of organizational response of a group 
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of hospitals in the San Francisco area during a doctors’ strike. Discontinuities or shocks can 
profoundly transform the structure of networks eventually resulting in the reorganization of an 
entire sector. At the same time, companies can use their networks to mitigate the uncertainty 
caused by such shocks. Since a jolt may interest the network at more than one level (e.g, the 
ego network, the dyads, the triads or the whole network), it is necessary to conduct multilevel 
research to get a complete picture of network dynamics. This thesis focuses specifically on 
egocentric networks, dyads, triads, and ultimately on the whole level since macro changes at 
the industry network level are driven by the aggregation of numerous micro changes (changes 
at the firm ego network level), much as the behavior of an overall market rests on the 
individual behaviors of numerous market participants (Koka, Madhavan, & Prescott, 2006: 
726). In particular, I explore the effects of an environmental jolt on the formation and 
dissolution of dyadic and triadic ties using a longitudinal dataset of nine years in the global 
airline industry. In so doing, I follow the more traditional definition of network change which 
defines network change as the formation, dissolution or replacement of (dyadic) ties. Given 
that an environmental jolt could also impact on network structure, it is also worth exploring 
the structural changes that the jolt produces and their impact on firm performance. 
Accordingly, I also explore how changes in the structure (e.g., creation of structural holes or 
network closure) impact on firm performance contingent on environmental changes. Below I 
summarize some noteworthy outcomes of my research: 
 In response to an exogenous shock, firms have a tendency to adopt a more 
conservative posture by limiting entrepreneurial networking actions; 
 At the dyadic level, this attitude is explained through the formation of relationships on 
the basis of similarity (homophily) during the jolt period; 
 At the triadic level, this attitude is explained through the formation of transitive triads 
(transitive closure) during the jolt period; 
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 Building a sparse network has a positive effect on operating performance of 
companies under conditions of stability; 
  After an exogenous shock, this strategy loses its efficacy; 
 Firm size is an important variable to take into account in studying network dynamics; 
  Large firms that build a sparse network during the jolt, report negative operating 
performance. 
 
 The empirical setting in which this research has been carried out is the global airline 
industry which is usually regarded as a troubled industry. This industry has repeatedly 
reported severe losses due to both inherent problems characterizing the industry (e.g, fierce 
competition following deregulation which saw the entrance of new competitors and the 
emergence of the low cost business models) and the fact that the financial performance of the 
industry is strongly correlated with the larger business cycle (Figure 2).  
 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
 Exogenous shocks such as the explosion of the dot-com bubble in 2000, the security 
implications of September 11th 2001, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome outbreak in 
2003 and the United States housing price bubble of 2007 have substantially impacted airlines 
capability to recover which has resulted in the collapse of many, sometimes well-established, 
airlines such as AOM French Airlines, Trans World Airlines (TWA), Pan American World 
Airways (Pan Am), Sabena, and Swissair just to name a few.  Faced with these challenges, 
airlines have increasingly understood the importance of cooperation first through dyadic ties 
and then through the creation of multi-partner alliances or constellations that compete with 
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each other and with other single big carriers, such as Virgin and Emirates, that do not belong 
to any of these constellations. The airline industry is being to a large extent considered a 
mature one, with established technology and transportation being considered as a commodity. 
Given that outright cross-border acquisitions are often disallowed, airlines have entered into 
alliances to build seamless networks with limited additional costs, to bypass restrictive 
regulations, to increase market presence and visibility, to create a unified marketing image, 
and to provide a foundation for the coordination of services to eventually reduce costs and 
competition (Iatrou & Oretti, 2007). For the above reasons the airline industry appeared to be 
an excellent context in which to test my hypotheses. As an exogenous and negative jolt, he 
9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States provided me with a natural experiment to conduct 
my research. To my knowledge, this has been the very first study to theorize and test on the 
impact of environmental jolts on interfirm networks and this, I believe, is the greatest 
contribution of this work which develops as follows. 
 This thesis is a collection of three essays. The first essay, "Adapting to Environmental 
Jolts: A Network Change Perspective", is a theoretical paper. Its main purpose is to 
understand the underlying forces that trigger network evolution by developing a conceptual 
framework at the firm and the environment levels of analysis. Non-routine situations, as 
opposed to routine ones, are seen as a central force in shaping patterns of network evolution. 
Firm level attributes size, centrality, and geographic scope are taken into account in the 
relationship between environmental change and network change. By paying attention to the 
impact of non-routine changes in the external environment, this paper facilitates bridging the 
theoretical foundations of network evolution from an evolutionary to a revolutionary view of 
network change. The other two essays are empirical and use second-order data although 
employing different statistical methods. The first empirical paper, "The Role of Environmental 
Jolts on Interorganizational Network Change: Empirical Evidence from the Global Airline 
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Industry, 1998-2006 ", focuses on the antecedents of network change. The purpose of this 
study is to investigate the impact of non-routine change in the environment on well 
established network mechanisms at the dyadic and triadic levels of analysis. The originality of 
this study lies in the fact that it is one of the very first network studies proposing, and 
empirically testing, a multilevel model of network change. Moreover, no previous studies 
have examined the longitudinal impact of disruptive forces on the network attributes at 
multiple levels of analysis. The second empirical paper, “Environmental Jolts, Firm Size, and 
the Relationship Between Brokerage and Firm Performance”, focuses on the consequences of 
network change. The purpose of this study is to investigate the characteristics at the 
environment and firm level that influence the relationship between a firm’s brokerage 
propensity and its performance. The link between a firm’s position in an alliance network and 
its performance is still poorly understood. This study contributes to the structural holes theory 
by proposing a contingency model that encapsulates both firm and environment attributes. 
Moreover, it departs from previous research that has analyzed the structural holes-
performance relationship in static environments by looking at the differences in this 
relationship in periods of equilibrium and disequilibrium. 
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APPENDIX 
Figure 1. Scope of inter-firm relationships 
 
Figure 2. Overview of the global airline industry profitability, 1987-2007 (Source: ICAO) 
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ADAPTING TO ENVIRONMENTAL JOLTS: A NETWORK CHANGE 
PERSPECTIVE 
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Abstract. Motivated by the need to understand which are the underlying forces that trigger 
network evolution, we develop a multilevel theoretical model to examine the relationship 
between changes in the environment and network change. We refer to network change as the 
dissolution or replacement of an interorganizational tie, adding also the case of the formation 
of new ties with new or preexisting partners. Previous research has paid scant attention to the 
organizational consequences of quantum change enveloping entire industries in favor of an 
emphasis on continuous change. To highlight radical change we introduce the concept of 
environmental jolt. Since network change can be explained at multiple levels, we incorporate 
the firm-level variables centrality, firm size, and geographic scope as moderators. 
Propositions linking environmental and firm attributes with network change are offered to 
enrich the discourse on network evolution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
Adapting To Environmental Jolts: A Network Change Perspective  
 
ABSTRACT 
Motivated by the need to understand which are the underlying forces that trigger network 
evolution, we develop a multilevel theoretical model to examine the relationship between 
changes in the environment and network change. We refer to network change as the 
dissolution or replacement of an interorganizational tie, adding also the case of the formation 
of new ties with new or preexisting partners. Previous research has paid scant attention to the 
organizational consequences of quantum change enveloping entire industries in favor of an 
emphasis on continuous change. To highlight radical change we introduce the concept of 
environmental jolt. Since network change can be explained at multiple levels, we incorporate 
the firm-level variables centrality, firm size, and geographic scope as moderators. 
Propositions linking environmental and firm attributes with network change are offered to 
enrich the discourse on network evolution. 
 
Keywords: multi-level; network change; environmental jolt 
 
INTRODUCTION 
From time to time, organizational environments undergo cataclysmic upheavals – 
changes so sudden and extensive that they alter the trajectories of entire industries, 
overwhelm the adaptive capacities of resilient organizations, and surpass the comprehension 
of seasoned managers (Meyer, Brooks, & Goes, 1990: 93). Transient perturbations whose 
occurrences are difficult to foresee and whose impacts on organizations are disruptive and 
potentially inimical are also known in literature as environmental jolts (Meyer, 1982). 
Scholars dealing with business studies have assumed for a long time that organizations 
operate in equilibria. This assumption of equilibrium and linearity has distracted 
organizational and strategic management researchers from studying the impact of profound 
changes in organizational theory and research. Although they recognize the existence of field-
wide flux, emergence, convergence and collapse, sidestep direct investigations of the causes 
and dynamic processes are often times left to political scientists and institutional economists 
(Meyer, Gaba, & Colwell, 2005). As a result, no theories and little empirical work have been 
14 
 
developed explaining the organizational consequences of quantum changes enveloping entire 
industries (Meyer et al., 1990) (words in italics added). Accordingly, we contribute to the 
literature by developing a network perspective of quantum change and by specifying an 
empirically testable multilevel theoretical model of environmental, network, and firm effects 
on network dynamics, following the occurrence of disruptive events. 
   A vast literature has documented that the fate of organizations is the outcome of 
organization/environment interaction (e.g. Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Strange enough, there is little research on how this interaction affects alliance 
networks. This paper focuses on environmental jolts as a central force in shaping patterns of 
network evolution. To investigate the process of change, we will employ a contingency model 
whereby environmental jolts provide the occasion for structuring. In particular, our dependent 
construct, brokerage propensity, indicates how entrepreneurial and flexible a firm is in 
structuring its network of ties. Moreover, in order to capture also the moderating role of the 
firm level contingencies we include in our analysis firm characteristics namely firm size, 
which indicates a firm’s potential to establish new ties based on its resources, geographic 
scope, which indicates how geographically interspersed a firm’s ties are, and network 
centrality which is a measure of structural embeddedness. 
Previous research has shown that organizations need to align to their environments if 
they are to survive, and network change is one way of aligning organizations with such 
environments (Kim, Hongseok, & Swaminathan, 2006). Following Kim et al. (2006), we 
define network change as the dissolution or replacement of an interorganizational network tie, 
adding also the case of the formation of new ties with preexisting partners or with new ones, 
that lead to a more dense or sparse network over time. 
Given this background, the particular theme we want to analyze is the impact of 
uncertainty on network change in the face of disruptive events. Our first assumption is that 
15 
 
quantum change provoked by an external shock generates extreme uncertainty (Meyer, 1982). 
Previous literature has recognized the importance of interorganizational linkages as 
uncertainty absorbers (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Firms are embedded in networks, which, in 
turn, are embedded in external environments. Dynamic changes in environments can be 
expected to have a strong influence on network evolution, yet such linkages have been rarely 
studied. The tradition in network analysis has been to view networks as given contexts for 
action, rather than as being subject to deliberate design (Nohria, 1992) assuming that network 
structure endures over time (Schott, 1991). In contrast, we follow more recent trends that 
address the need for an evolutionary perspective on interfirm networks (e.g., Madhavan, 
Koka, & Prescott, 1998).  
Overall we have three main goals in this paper. First, we review previous contributions 
on environmental jolts and punctuated equilibrium theory in an attempt to reconcile the 
evolutionary and revolutionary views of organizational change. Second, by incorporating 
environmental jolts as an integral part in our study, we contribute to the alliance and network 
literature by recasting emphasis on the relationship between external environmental context 
and firm level network restructuring. Third, by adopting a dynamic approach toward the study 
of how networks evolve and change over time, the study has also important implications for 
managers seeking to build effective networks. Following previous contributions, we argue 
that alliance networks are intentionally shaped by alliance managers surpassing the idea that 
they are given contexts for action. Thus, in order to understand how managers do this, 
research needs to move beyond asking how networks constrain and shape action, to 
examining what factors constrain and shape networks (Madhavan et al.,1998:440). 
We proceed as follows. The following section reviews the existing literature on 
change, moving progressively from organizational to network change, and triggers of change, 
the environmental jolts in our case. We then proceed with a review of the main contributions 
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regarding brokerage and closure network strategies as adaptation strategies in the face of 
situations of turbulence. In the ensuing section, we develop propositions on how situations of 
extreme uncertainty generated by environmental jolts affect network strategies also contingent 
on firm variables. Discussion and conclusions follow. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Theories of Change: Incremental versus Quantum Change  
Literature dealing with organizational change has studied the process of change in 
various ways. Change has been portrayed both as a continuous organizational process (March, 
1981) and as brief episodes interspersed between long periods of stability and inertia (Miller 
& Friesen, 1984). Some writers have focused on changes as volitional managerial actions 
(Andrews, 1971) while others conceive of changes as results of unforeseen exogenous events 
(Meyer, 1982). Change happens in two fundamentally different modes as proposed by Meyer 
et al. (1990). Continuous, or first-order change, occurs within a stable system that itself 
remains unchanged. Discontinuous, or second-order change, transforms fundamental 
properties or states of the system. First-order change is incremental or evolutionary while 
second-order change is said to be of a quantum nature because many elements change in a 
major or a minor way within a brief interval. Quantum changes are defined as revolutionary 
when they radically transform many elements of the structure. The distinction between first 
and second order change has been likened to that between simple motion and acceleration 
(Watzlawick, Weakland, & Fisch, 1974). The concepts of first and second order change have 
been applied in virtually every unit of analysis examined by organizational scientists: single- 
versus double-loop learning by individuals (Argyris & Schӧn, 1979), variations versus 
reorientations in products (Normann, 1971), adaptation versus metamorphosis by 
organizations (Miller & Friesen, 1984), competence-enhancing versus competence-destroying 
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changes in technology (Tushman & Anderson, 1986), and evolution versus revolution in 
industries (Schumpeter, 1950). Adding the level at which change is assumed to occur 
provides a second dimension for classifying organizational change. Thus, theories about how 
firms maintain alignments with their environments can be classified along the aforementioned 
dimensions, mode (first versus second order) and level (firms versus industry) of change 
(Meyer et al., 1990). 
 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
One paradigm that has heavily influenced our thinking about change processes is 
Darwin’s model of evolution as a slow stream of small mutations, gradually shaped by 
environmental selection into novel forms (Gersick, 1991). Within the field of evolutionary 
biology, however, Darwinian gradualism has been challenged by the punctuated equilibrium 
model of evolution proposed by Eldredge and Gould (1972). These authors claim that 
lineages exist in essentially static form (equilibrium) over most of their histories, and new 
species arise abruptly, through sudden, revolutionary “punctuations” of rapid change 
(Gersick, 1991). Advocates of the incremental view of change in organizational literature are 
adaptation theorists such as Miles and Snow (1978) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) at the 
firm level.  At the industry level, population ecologists (e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 1989) argue 
that differential rates in the entry and exit of firms cause populations to evolve gradually to fit 
the technical and economic constraints of environmental niches while institutional theorists 
(e.g. Scott, 1987) argue that organizations experience pressure to conform to the normative 
expectations of their institutional environments. On the other hand, organizational theorists 
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who have adopted the punctuated-equilibrium perspective propose that organizational 
evolution has two distinct and recurring phases: 1) long periods of quasi-equilibrium, during 
which organizations make only incremental changes in structure and activities, and 2) brief 
periods of disequilibrium, during which many new organizations appear and many existing 
ones are transmogrified (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Miner, 
Amburgey, & Sterns, 1990; Haveman, Russo, & Meyer, 2001). The exogenous shocks that 
punctuate equilibria make it possible for novel organizational mutations, intentional or 
random, to take hold (Haveman et al., 2001). Subsequent periods of flux endure until a 
dominant design emerges. A period of incremental change, characterized by relative stability, 
then follows which is, in turn, broken by a new discontinuity. At its heart, punctuated 
equilibrium is a theoretical explanation for how organizations will typically accomplish 
fundamental transformation. Meyer’s (1982) seminal work directly explored the influence on 
revolutionary change of environmental jolts concluding that they provoke crises in the 
organizations that facilitate revolutionary transformation. 
 
The Influence Of Environmental Change On Organizational Change 
 The distinction drawn between incremental and quantum change can be associated to 
the concepts of uncertainty and jolt. Uncertainty reflects the unpredictability and volatility of 
an industry while a jolt is a high-impact and low-duration event. Changes in these two 
dimensions may influence changes in interorganizational ties with the former producing more 
gradual change over time while the latter generates significant change. 
Jolts. Although minor, incremental changes may occur gradually over long periods of 
time, the likelihood of a major restructuring may only occur when the organization encounters 
an “exogenous shock” (Barley, 1986: 80) such as a technological breakthrough, a large-scale 
shift in government regulation, and a strong political reform. Such a shock may be 
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conceptualized as a sudden, dramatic increase in uncertainty (Tushman & Anderson, 1986). 
Environmental jolts, may create uninhabited or unexploited habitats where new forms of 
organization can thrive (e.g. Russo, 2001) and in some occasions may redesign the boundaries 
of a whole industry.   
The result of destabilizing environmental jolts is often a re-examination of 
institutionalized logics and practices and a reorientation of organizational strategies and 
processes with environmental demands (Oliver, 1992; Sine & David, 2003). Jolts act as 
catalysts of change just as novel scientific theories emerge only amid a mounting state of 
crisis caused by failure of existing paradigms to adequately explain observed reality (Kuhn, 
1970; Sine & David, 2003). Environmental jolts rarely threaten the survival of soundly 
designed organizations with well-maintained environmental alignments. However, seismic 
tremors often disclose hidden flaws in the architecture and construction of buildings, and 
environmental jolts trigger responses that reveal how organizations adapt to their 
environments (Meyer, 1982). 
After an environmental jolt, new opportunities are concomitantly created as the 
environment redefines attractive market positions (Meyer et al., 1990). Although jolts affect 
all firms, individual firms may deal with these jolts in different ways. Indeed, the exploitation 
of new opportunities or the growth and survival after a period of turmoil vary among firms. 
However, instead of viewing an environmental jolt as a crisis that is dangerous or destructive, 
some scholars suggest that firms can perceive it largely as changes in the opportunity set in 
the external environment (Meyer, 1982; Haveman, 1992; Wan & Yiu, 2009). 
Uncertainty. Research has shown that environments can affect firms’ strategies as 
well as their performance (Porter, 1980). Therefore, it is plausible to argue that changes in the 
environment will influence a firm’s decision makers. Adapting to environmental 
contingencies and exploiting the opportunities created by those contingencies can be a source 
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of competitive advantage. Environmental dynamism concerns the amount of uncertainty 
emanating from the external environment (Baum & Wally, 2003). Dynamism is reflected by 
the regularity in and amount of change occurring in the environment. Recent theory and 
empirical research suggests that discontinuities lead to eras of great ferment, experimentation 
and uncertainty and environmental jolts are one of the elements producing such uncertainty. 
The notion of uncertainty has been defined in a variety of ways in the literature.  For 
example, information theorists define uncertainty of an event “as the logarithm of the number 
of possible outcomes the event can have…” (Garner, 1962: 19) while organizational theorists 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967: 27) state that uncertainty consists of three components: 1) the 
lack of clarity of information, 2) the long time span of definitive feedback, and 3) the general 
uncertainty of causal relationships. Cyert and March (1963) and March and Simon (1958) 
have argued that the reduction and management of uncertainty is a major organizational 
enterprise. Furthermore, Thompson (1967: 159) asserted that dealing with uncertainty is the 
essence of the administrative process (emphasis added in italics). 
We begin with a definition of uncertainty that underpins most others’ definitions: 
uncertainty is the incapacity to predict future states of the world (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Anderson & Tushman, 2001; Beckman, Haunschild, & Philips, 2004). As Dess and Beard 
(1984) emphasize, it is not simply a proxy for variation or fast rates of change. Indeed, rapid 
but entirely predictable change creates no uncertainty at all. 
Scholars that have dealt with uncertainty have classified the concept in a variety of 
ways. Wernefelt and Karnani (1987) have distinguished between demand, supply, competitive 
uncertainty and uncertainty stemming from external factors, Beckman et al. (2004) between 
market and firm-specific uncertainty, Podolny (2001) between actor egocentric and 
altercentric uncertainty while Anderson and Tushman (2001) between market and 
technological uncertainty.  
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The label “environmental” is attached to the term uncertainty when the source of the 
uncertainty is the organization’s external environment. Thus, the “something” which is 
unpredictable is specified as being the organizational environment (Milliken, 1987). More 
specifically, some scholars (e.g., Duncan, 1972; Miles & Snow, 1978) argue that uncertainty 
should be related to specific components of the environments such as suppliers, competitors 
or customers. Environmental uncertainty has been viewed and measured using both objective 
and perceptual approaches (Duncan, 1972; Yasai-Ardekani, 1986; Milliken, 1987). The 
former implies that it is possible to characterize environments in terms of how objectively 
uncertain they are (e.g., Child, 1972); the latter implies that environmental uncertainty is 
inherently “in the eye of the beholder” and thus ought to be studied as a perceptual 
phenomenon (e.g., Huber, O’Connell, &  Cummings, 1975).  
 
Adapting to Environmental Change: the Role of Interorganizazional Strategic Alliances  
The message that organizations must adjust their structure to changes in their 
environment has been a dominant one in the organizational literature (Miller, 1981). The main 
assumption underlying this stream of research is that the environment is not a constant 
variable and that the firm may have to change its structure in response to environmental 
contingencies. More recently scholars have begun to think of the firm as an interconnected 
entity, rather than an independent actor that adjusts its structure and strategy to environmental 
changes without taking into account its surrounding relationships. According to the resource-
based view (RBV), a firm’s resources drive value creation via the development of competitive 
advantage. Specifically, it is suggested that possessing valuable and rare resources provides 
the basis for value creation. This value may be sustainable when those resources are also 
inimitable and lack substitutes (Barney, 1991). In their role of uncertainty absorbers, network 
ties prove to be themselves a key strategic resource. However, a firm’s ability to maximize 
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the value of the network as a resource is partly contingent on its ability to respond to 
environmental stimuli. Accordingly, the importance of the environment for managing 
resources suggests that contingency theory logic should be integrated into our understanding 
of the RBV. 
The structure of networks of interorganizational ties plays an important role in the 
evolution of an industry. Consequently, managers engage in strategic maneuvering to secure 
key positions in their industry’s network, such as entering into strategic alliances in order to 
ensure access to key technologies or other resources. Hence, periods of strategic change in the 
history of an industry are often marked by observable flurries of interfirm activity (Madhavan 
et al., 1998: 440). Alliances are one of the key ways that firms respond to uncertainty and 
rapid environmental change (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Gulati, 1998) because they are 
perceived as faster, lower cost, and more reversible than internal development or acquisition. 
According to Gulati and Gargiulo (1999), strategic alliances are a vivid example of voluntary 
cooperation in which organizations combine resources to cope with the uncertainty created by 
environmental forces beyond their direct control. Indeed, the number of interorganizational 
alliances has grown and this is partly due to the increasing uncertainty surrounding the 
international business arena (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). Thus, rapid and unpredictable changes 
in the environment may lead to changes in an organization’s needs and its orientation toward 
ongoing partnerships (MacIntyre, 1981). These changes in needs and orientation can derive 
from continuous processes or can be triggered by unforeseen events. Whatever the source of 
change, alliances follow evolutionary paths that produce an impact on firms’ performance 
(Harrigan, 1985). Following Gulati (1998: 305), we argue that the evolution of some alliances 
may be akin to a punctuated equilibrium model in which there may be discrete stages that 
occur due to discontinuous changes in the environment (Gray & Yan, 1997). 
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In its most notable explication, the evolutionary view of networks emphasizes network 
structure as its own context for evolution (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). On the other hand, most 
of the alliance research suggests that firms form interorganizational networks in response to 
environmental stimuli exogenous to the network (Koka et al., 2006) – for example resource 
dependence theorists argue that interorganizational linkages are a means to cope with 
environmental changes (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). External, as well as internal, factors act as 
occasions for firms to take advantage of the ensuing changes to structure their ego networks 
in order to strengthen their position in the network. Key events such as technological 
shakeouts have the power to disrupt previous configurations and their impact on structure 
may be either structure-reinforcing or structure-loosening (Madhavan et al., 1998). However, 
most of the existing literature focusing on the effects of disruptive events on structure has 
analyzed the impact of endogenous jolts. According to this literature, the impetus for 
structure-loosening events, initiated by players who are already in key positions in the 
network (e.g., a new pricing strategy) is more likely to come from small peripheral firms 
while the opposite happens for structure-reinforcing events that are initiated by more 
peripheral players who desire to improve their positions. The consequences on network 
structure of exogenous shocks need yet to be explored.  
 Received literature highlights two basic network strategies firms can adopt as a 
response to environmental change: expanding or enhancing the interconnectedness of their 
relational neighborhoods. These choices also affect the position that the firm will occupy in 
the network over time. In periods of relative tranquility characterized by incremental change, 
the positional modifications are less relevant in magnitude when compared to adjustments 
made following a period of upheaval. 
 Brokerage and Closure. Research has emphasized two distinct yet interrelated 
approaches on how firms can structure their networks. In essence, these two approaches 
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reflect alternative network strategies employed by firms in the pursuit of competitive 
advantage (Koka & Prescott, 2008). The first approach emphasizes the benefits arising to 
firms because of their embeddedness in the network. Networks that show high degrees of 
closure – also called dense networks to underline that all the partners are linked to each other 
directly – are the source of positive outcomes. The more closed the network, the stronger the 
benefits, because in closed networks information about behavior flows faster, trust and norms 
develop more quickly and effective sanctions that ensure trustworthiness can be applied more 
rapidly on firms that violate their partner’s expectations (Coleman, 1988). In sociology, 
Granovetter (1985) argues that the threat of sanctions makes trust more likely between people 
who have mutual friends (mutual friends being a condition of “structural embeddedness”). 
From this perspective, firms tend to reinvest in present network structures, rather than 
expanding them. Such behavior will lead to a progressive network closure over time. The 
second approach draws on Burt’s (1992) structural holes construct to highlight entrepreneurial 
benefits arising to firms. Emphasizing the importance of open networks – networks where 
partners have no direct linkages among themselves – Burt argues that the network position 
associated with the highest economic return lie between, and not within, dense regions of 
relationships. From this perspective, firms tend to broaden their present network structures. 
Such a behavior will lead to a progressive network expansion over time. An elegant way to 
reconcile the debate around closure and brokerage is to adopt a contingency approach. 
Focusing on environmental change is one of the contingencies that has been recently 
proposed.  
PROPOSITIONS 
Building on the above we develop a multilevel theoretical model with independent and 
dependent constructs at multiple levels (Klein, Danserau, & Hall, 1994) to specify how 
environmental and firm attributes affect network design. Several reasons brought us to build a 
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multilevel model. Prior research has examined network dynamics at firm (Beckman et al., 
2004), network (Madhavan et al., 1998), and environmental level (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Moreover, multilevel models are particularly suited for scholars who adopt a relational 
approach since it is easy to move from one level to another. Indeed, expanding the analysis to 
include both firm, and environmental contingencies enriches our discussion on how networks 
evolve and change over time.  
To choose our independent constructs we applied the following “tests”. First, the 
constructs should be the most appropriate for modeling multilevel network change 
phenomena. Previous contributions on network change have already called for the adoption of 
a multilevel perspective in explaining network dynamics (e.g., Kim et al., 2006). In addition, 
the constructs should have sufficient theoretical and empirical support in the literature 
(Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). The constructs that met our tests are: (1) environmental jolts 
(environmental-level attribute), (3) centrality, (4) firm size, and (5) geographic scope (firm-
level attributes). 
We believe that our considerations on network change face specific challenges: 
limited amount of resources and breath of operations of a firm, environmental impacts, and 
network constraints. Thus, we seek to investigate the roles of organizational and 
environmental characteristics as well as the network context, as we contend that firms 
collaborative choices are highly contingent on these elements. 
The line of reasoning is as follows. Firms basically live in relative tranquility that is 
abruptly interrupted by periods of flux. When the environment is stable, they should pursue 
the advantages stemming from closure in order to build alliances with trusted partners. On the 
other hand, in periods of instability they should be flexible enough to adapt to the new 
scenarios and adopt a more entrepreneurial orientation while maintaining their previous 
alliances that were built with key partners for strategic resources. This line of reasoning fits 
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with the idea that the benefits stemming from brokerage are short-termed and subject to decay 
while closure benefits tend to endure over time (Burt, 2002). 
 
Effects of Environmental Attributes 
Given the importance of network closure and brokerage as key dimensions of network 
design and the fact that they lie behind the structure of a firm’s relationships as explained in 
the previous section, we focus our study on how changes in uncertainty impact on network 
structure when the environment is unstable. 
Previous literature documents well that variability across organizational environments 
affects the nature of organizational strategies and strategy formulation (Dess, 1987). 
Therefore, changes in the environmental scenarios are likely to cause network changes. More 
specifically environmental conditions affect the opportunities available to firms, in terms of 
the potential array of interfirm options, and the resources available for network actions (Koka 
& Prescott, 2008). Our assumption is that environmental jolts have a significant power to 
change the levels of environmental predictability which, in turn, affect network design. After 
a jolt takes place, an increase in uncertainty is accompanied by a decrease in resource 
availability. Under such conditions, literature has suggested that building sparse networks, in 
our case the adoption of a brokerage posture, is the preferred strategy (Burt, 2000; Rowley, 
Behrens, & Krakhardt, 2000). In a similar vein, Koka and Prescott (2008) argue that 
following an environment-changing event, it is more beneficial to search entrepreneurial 
rather than prominent positions in the interfirm network whereas stable environments 
emphasize the importance of dense networks and prominence. Previous research in this field 
has mainly focused on endogenous events which take place inside the industry boundaries. 
Endogenous jolts have the peculiarity that, although they act as occasions for industry 
restructuring, they are typically initiated by incumbents. Examples of such events are 
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regulatory reforms or radical technological changes affecting an industry. This changes will 
produce an observable impact on the network of relations within the industry pushing firms to 
reinforce their current relationships or to initiate a new set of relationships with a different set 
of partners (Madhavan et al., 1998). However, in the face of exogenous events such as wars 
and natural disasters, to which neither core nor peripheral players have power on, the 
outcomes may be not so easy to predict in terms of structural change.  
 
Proposition 1: Under conditions of high uncertainty following an environmental jolt, there 
will be an increase in firms’ brokerage propensity. 
 
Effects of Firm Attributes  
The notion of centrality reflects the significance of a firm in its network. Being a well-
connected and significant player in a network can be a source of competitive advantage 
(Madhavan et al., 1998). At the simplest level of conceptualization, a highly central firm is 
likely to be connected to many more partners than the less central firm. Centrality comes from 
being the object of relations from other contacts. Firms central in interorganizational networks 
are exposed to more sources of information than more peripheral firms. Moreover, the central 
firm is in a favorable position to see a more complete picture of all the available options in the 
network (Lin, Yang, & Demirkan, 2007). However, aside of the benefits described, centrality 
has some downturns too. The most notable is the tendency of central firms to be 
overembedded in their existing networks which could lead to inertia and threat rigidity (Staw 
Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981) or learning myopia (Levinthal & March, 1993). When the 
environment is stable, we expect central firms to strengthen their position by consolidating 
previous partnerships while forging few new alliances in order to broaden their opportunity 
set. On the contrary, following a jolt, an increase in the level of uncertainty could stress the 
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importance of trusted partners with whom the firm has already transacted in the past 
(Podolny, 1994; Gulati, 1995) or of partners of trusted partners. Support for this argument 
derives from Granovetter’s (1982) assertion that strong ties are more likely to be useful to an 
actor who is in an insecure position. Focusing resources on a few philos ties could be the 
preferred action when the ego is facing uncertainty and change (Krackhardt, 1992) and 
occupies a central position. This behavior could be also justified by central firms desire to 
maintain their position of privilege in the network in that the more central a firm is, the more 
it is visible. High network visibility, generated by centrality, is an asset in that it renders the 
firm a desirable partner since partnering with a central firm could give access to a larger pool 
of relations. Hence, when the environment is unstable, central firms may be more risk adverse 
(and thus less prone to forge alliances with new partners) which hinders their brokerage 
propensity. On the other hand, more peripheral firms will try to loosen the previous network 
structure in order to gain more centrality. According to this reasoning, more peripheral firms 
may adopt a more entrepreneurial orientation when the environment is experiencing an 
environmental jolt.  
 
Proposition 2: The increase in brokerage propensity following an environmental jolt is likely 
to be stronger for less central firms than for more central ones. 
 
 The differences between firms and environments in terms of resource abundance 
constrain a firm’s ability to form alliances and adapt to external environment (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982; Lin et al., 2007). Thus, managers need to decide how to allocate their resources 
while structuring their alliance networks which implies a trade-off between favoring a more 
or less entrepreneurial posture. 
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 Given that resources play a critical role, the impact of an environmental jolt on 
network design also depends on firm size, a commonly adopted proxy for firm resources in 
the organization literature. Accordingly, firm size is of great importance in the face of 
extreme uncertainty. Despite a widespread (but often implicit) recognition of its importance, 
little contemporary research attention focuses on size (Dobrev & Caroll, 2003). Such 
reductionism has led the majority of empirical studies – in either strategic management or 
organization theory – to include size as a control variable (Dobrev & Caroll, 2003).   
 Larger firms have generally more resources compared to the smaller ones to allocate 
to the diversification of their network. Conversely, smaller firms should be more constrained 
in terms of partners choice and volume of new alliances they can create. Moreover, following 
population ecology literature, we argue that large organizational size enhances the capacity to 
withstand environmental shocks, whereas the margins for error are small for small 
organizations because they cannot easily adapt to temporary setbacks (Hannan & Freeman, 
1977). Although the dimension advantage poses large firms at lower risk of failure, it acts at 
the same time as a constraint toward change. Such rigidity of size may be even stronger when 
the environment is hostile. On the other hand, smaller firms will have higher incentives to be 
entrepreneurial, exploit the window of opportunity created by the shock, and maximize their 
limited network opportunities.  
  
Proposition 3: The increase in brokerage propensity following an environmental jolt is likely 
to be weaker for large firms than for small ones.  
 
Geographic scope, defined as the international extent of a firm’s operations (Delios & 
Beamish, 1999) will also influence a firm’s ability to structure its network. We assume that 
the more geographically expanded the operations of a firm are, the more networking 
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opportunities will accrue to that firm. On the other hand, firms that forge alliances in the same 
geographical areas will probably create a more stable and reliable network but will incur in 
greater redundancy. Thus, the more internationally expanded are a firm’s operations, the more 
it will be able to exploit opportunities for arbitrage and to set terms of trade that favor it over 
its partners. Accordingly, geographic scope could be of particular usefulness during a crisis. 
However, a broad international presence could push a company to feel at more ease in the 
face of a disruption. Firms that already have international presence, may have less incentives 
to expand their networks internationally. For a company with a broad geographic scope of 
operations, expanding its network internationally would generate a reinforcing effect. On the 
other hand, a more localized company will have higher incentives to diversify its network 
internationally in the face of an environmental jolt. Expanding operations internationally 
through alliances would be a less costly and faster option to diversify risk than establishing 
activities in safer regions through direct investments. 
 
Proposition 4: The increase in brokerage propensity following an environmental jolt is likely 
to be weaker for firms with a broader geographic scope. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Motivated by the need to understand which are the underlying forces that trigger 
network evolution, we have looked at the impact of environmental, and firm variables on 
network change. We defined network change as the change in a firm’s portfolio of ties. The 
mechanism behind such process can be explained at multiple levels: how the external 
environment (environmental jolts), structural embeddedness (network centrality), and firm 
characteristics (firm size and geographic scope) enable, or constrain, network change. 
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 Thus, formulating the enablers of network change provides fresh insights into a 
vibrant stream of research on interorganizational relations: network evolution. Combining an 
ecological perspective using the relational approach is not novel (e.g., Burt, 1992; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1989). However, efforts to integrate these two perspectives revolve around basic  
concepts such as niche or structural equivalence to find statistical effects of covariates in 
statistical models (Kim et al., 2006). Moreover, it has long been assumed that the source of 
change in interorganizational networks is the network itself neglecting the role of the external 
environment. Likewise, this endogenous view of network evolution has assumed that change 
is a gradual process disregarding radical change. Our network change perspective may 
facilitate bridging the theoretical foundations of network evolution from an evolutionary to a 
revolutionary view of network change. 
 By focusing on the enablers of network change we have disregarded the impediments 
and constraints that may obstacle the transition of networks from one state to another. To 
overcome this limitation, future studies may address the following question: What is the role 
of network change disablers in limiting a firm’s ability to modify its tie portfolio? 
Organizational age, status, organizational history and culture, dimension of the alliance 
portfolio, regulatory barriers are just few of the constraints that could increase network 
inertia. 
 Beyond empirical testing to see if the proposed association between network change 
and the other variables holds, we believe that our work can be used as a starting point to 
address questions such as: How does network change relate to firm performance? What is the 
role of the external context on the relationship between network change and firm 
performance? Future research may use longitudinal research designs to explore such matters. 
 Networks as organizational forms have become well institutionalized (Powell, 1990) 
and much of the literature has focused on dyadic change, such as partner selection, while 
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being silent on the implications of  such activities  for the evolution of whole networks (Koka 
et al., 2006). Switching the attention from only one level of analysis toward a multilevel 
perspective appears as a promising avenue for future research also stimulated by recent 
development of multilevel network modeling tools such a p* (Koka et al., 2006). 
 For alliance managers, incorporating the external environment when building their 
alliance networks is of extreme importance since it would lead to a broader and less biased 
picture of the whole array of opportunities available. Another critical aspect is learning from 
rare events such as environmental jolts. Are companies and their managers able to learn from 
environmental jolts? If they do learn, are managers able to develop crisis management 
capabilities over time? Companies usually safeguard from such events via contingency plans. 
However, do they take advantage of previous errors in order to recover rapidly in the face of 
future shocks? 
 In conclusion, changing network ties can contribute to a firm’s competitive advantage 
over its competitors. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that such change is not always 
the result of deliberate action but it is rather a necessity in order to cope with the uncertainties 
generated by the external environment as well as with the challenges posed by the network in 
which a firm is embedded, and the strategic moves of its actors, along with the firm’s 
peculiarities. The multilevel model of network change we have proposed allows a better 
understanding of such dynamics. 
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APPENDIX  
 
Table 1. Models of change within organizations and industries (Meyer et al., 1990) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm 
Level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry 
Level 
 Fisrt-Order Change Second-Order Change 
 Adaptation Metamorphosis 
Focus 
 
Incremental change 
within organizations 
Frame-breaking change 
within organizations 
Mechanisms Incrementalism Resource dependence 
Life cycle stages 
Configuration transitions 
Authors 
Lindblom (1959) 
Miles & Snow (1978) 
Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) 
Ginsberg (1988) 
Greiner (1972) 
Miller & Friesen (1984) 
Tushman & Romanelli (1985) 
 
Evolution Revolution 
Focus 
 
Incremental change 
within established industries 
Emergence, transformation, 
and decline of industries 
Mechanisms Natural selection Institutional isomorphism 
Punctuated equilibrium 
Quantum specification 
Authors 
Hannan & Freeman (1977) 
McKelvey & Aldrich (1983) 
DiMaggio & Powell (1983) 
Scott (1987) 
Zucker (1987) 
Astley (1985) 
Barney (1986) 
Gould & Eldredge (1977) 
Schumpeter (1950) 
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Abstract. This study uses the panel data social network analysis program SIENA to estimate 
the effects of well established network mechanisms at multiple levels of analysis on alliance 
formation. The concept of environmental jolt is introduced to see if and how a network 
evolves in a linear or in a punctuated way. The study reveals that firms react to 
environmental jolts by forming homophilous ties and transitive triads as opposed to the non 
jolt periods. The empirical setting is the global airline industry, which can be regarded as a 
constantly changing network of alliances. Our findings suggest that jolts are an important 
predictor of network change and should be thus incorporated in studies of network dynamics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 A shorter version of this paper is currently under review at the SMS 2012 Conference. 
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The Role of Environmental Jolts on Interorganizational Network Change: Empirical 
Evidence from the Global Airline Industry, 1998-2006 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study uses the panel data social network analysis program SIENA to estimate the effects 
of well established network mechanisms at multiple levels of analysis on alliance formation. 
The concept of environmental jolt is introduced to see if and how a network evolves in a 
linear or in a punctuated way. The study reveals that firms react to environmental jolts by 
forming homophilous ties and transitive triads as opposed to the non jolt periods. The 
empirical setting is the global airline industry, which can be regarded as a constantly changing 
network of alliances. Our findings suggest that jolts are an important predictor of network 
change and should be thus incorporated in studies of network dynamics.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 During the last decades organization and management theory scholars have 
progressively moved the focus of their research from individual firms to the interactions 
between them giving birth to the social networks stream of literature. One of the most 
prominent ideas of this approach is that organizations are embedded in thick webs of 
relationships that can facilitate or constrain economic action. This would suggest that 
economic relationships between actors might be more likely when they have a prior social 
relationship. Indeed, previous network ties have been shown to determine future network ties 
given that firms tend to partner with companies with whom they have partnered in the past 
(Gulati, 1995). 
 Given this background, the selection of actors with whom the firm will transact 
becomes of critical importance in pursuing a sustainable competitive advantage over time. 
Scholars have conducted substantial research on factors that affect partner selection in 
interorganizational networks. Partner selection is critical to network theory, as it is a 
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fundamental driver of network stability and change (Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004). 
Previous literature on interorganizational relationships provides a number of alternative 
explanations for why organizations seek partnerships with other organizations. Among these 
are efficiency, legitimacy, power and  the acquisition of scarce resources (Galaskiewicz, 
1985; Oliver, 1990). Partners are especially sought out when environments are turbulent in 
order to mitigate uncertainty and buffer core technologies (Thompson, 1967). 
 Despite the advances in our understanding of partner selection at the dyadic level and 
of the effects of networks, still most of our theorizing suggests a static approach on the part of 
these actors with respect to the network itself. Indeed, one of the previous standard criticisms 
of the social network research program was its neglect of network change (Emirbayer & 
Goodwin, 1994: 1413). More recently, research concerning network change at the 
interorganizational level has appeared (e.g., Gulati, 2007; Zaheer & Soda, 2009). The use of 
new analytical developments that deal with some of the tricky issues concerning statistical 
dependence seem to be particularly promising for research on network change (Kilduff & 
Brass, 2010). However, empirical studies using such tools have been mostly limited to 
interpersonal networks (Snijders, van de Bunt, & Steglich, 2010). We fill this void by testing 
a model of network dynamics at the macro level.  
 In prior research related to network change at the interorganizational level, scholars 
have largely focused on the network structure as a predictor of network evolution (Koka, 
Madhavan, & Prescott, 2006). In this paper we challenge this argument. Although we 
acknowledge the importance of network structure as a predictor of network evolution, we 
suggest that environmental factors exogenous to the network can be a major driver of network 
partner selection. However, small changes in the external environment will not create the urge 
for change given that organizations tend to be structurally inert. The likelihood of a major 
restructuring may only occur when the organization encounters an “exogenous shock” 
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(Barley, 1986: 80). Transient perturbations whose occurrences are difficult to foresee and 
whose impacts on organizations are disruptive and potentially inimical are also known in 
literature as environmental jolts (Meyer, 1982). Supporting evidence would suggest that 
environmental jolts affect network change and thus are influential in the emergence of new 
networks as organizations adjust to the external changes. 
 As an exogenous shock, the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks (also known as 
“9/11”) in the United States provide us with a natural experiment to observe how differentials 
in unpredictability following a major shakeout affect firms network design in the airline 
industry before, during, and after an environmental jolt. The 9/11 has been one of the worse 
and unexpected tragedies of the last decades which severely impacted the US economy and 
consequently the global economy producing a “domino effect”. As a result, firms wealth was 
severely hit by the sudden shock and some of them were forced to disappear from the 
business arena. 
 By addressing patterns of network structure, social network analysis permits the study 
of the whole and the parts of social networks simultaneously (Wellman, 1988). The parts of 
the networks include dyads, triads, cliques and larger structures such as components (Kilduff 
& Brass, 2010). Despite the intrinsic advantage of the network approach in which a researcher 
can simultaneously address actor, group and network characteristics, previous contributions 
have mostly focused either on ego (Ahuja, 2000), the dyad (Gulati, 1995), the triad 
(Madhavan, Gnyawali, & He, 2004) or the whole network (Provan & Milward, 1995). To 
complete such puzzle, this paper seeks to advance our understanding of network dynamics by 
focusing on how non-routine events stemming from the external environment can transform 
network structure at multiple levels of analysis. 
 Many previous studies on the issues surrounding interorganizational networks have 
been cross-sectional in nature which have prevented researchers from empirically separating a 
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firm’s network ties and network positions from their antecedents. To do so, researchers need 
to depart from the traditional static view of networks and rely on dynamic models that capture 
changes in network structures over extended periods (Shipilov, 2006). The airline industry 
provides an opportunity to empirically test our hypotheses over the period 1998-2006 and to 
contribute to the small but growing research on network dynamics  (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; 
Shipilov, 2006; Zaheer & Soda, 2009). Airlines utilize bilateral and multilateral alliances in 
order to meet the ever increasing demand for seamless travel and to share costs and revenues. 
These networks consist of horizontal alliances, which allows us to mitigate some of the 
effects power-related factors can play in networks containing a dominant player among 
several overly-dependent suppliers or distributors (Rowley, Behrens, & Krachardt, 2000). 
 We proceed as follows. The following section reviews the existing literature on 
environmental jolts and network change. We then proceed with a discussion of how sudden 
changes in the external environment affect well established network properties at the dyadic 
and the triadic levels. In the ensuing section, we provide a description of our research context. 
Lastly we describe our data, statistical methods and measures. We conclude with the 
implications of our results.  
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Environmental jolts and interorganizational network change 
 The partner selection literature documents why firms ally, the circumstances under 
which alliances can improve performance, and the conditions under which firms face 
increasing costs due to their alliances. Firms typically form alliances to lean about new 
practices and technologies (Kogut, 1988), pool complementary resources (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996), and enter new markets (Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). The outcome of 
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building relationships with different partners is a web of ties, also known as a firm’s alliance 
portfolio. The alliance portfolio is akin to the notion of the egocentric network (Lavie, 2007). 
Social network theories have been recently applied in studies of performance implications of 
strategic networks (Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000). Several studies have examined how the 
number of alliances, and network properties such as density and structural holes, affect firms’ 
innovation output, new product development, revenue growth, market share, market value, or 
profitability (Ahuja, 2000; Rothaermel, 2001; Rowley et al., 2000; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 
1999; Zaheer & Bell, 2005). Nevertheless, although there is an increasing interest in 
understanding network outcomes, less attention has been paid on the antecedents and the 
causes of network structure. The understanding of network outcomes is incomplete without an 
appreciation of the genesis and evolution of the underlying network structure (Ahuja, Soda, & 
Zaheer, 2011). The issue of time becomes fundamental in explaining network dynamics and 
surpassing the static view of networks. The passage of time is required for relationships to be 
cemented, be strengthened, and become imbued with trust and affect (Krackhardt, 1992). On 
the other hand, as time passes the purpose for which a relationship was built may decay or 
external events could make the relationship become dysfunctional for the parties involved 
leading to its dissolution.  
 Ahuja et al. (2011) have identified four microfoundations to explain the genesis and 
evolution of networks, namely agency, opportunity, inertia, and exogenous factors. By 
microfoundations these authors mean the basic factors that drive or shape the formation, 
persistence, dissolution, and content of ties in the network. Although our focus is mainly on 
how exogenous factors affect structural change at the dyadic- and triadic- levels, our 
theoretical framework comprehends also the other three mechanisms as we believe they are 
all interrelated. We choose to focus mainly on exogenous factors and random processes for 
the following reason. Quite surprisingly, among the four microfoundations, exogenous factors 
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is still the less explored one although business environments are constantly and increasingly 
hit by shocks and discontinuities. More broadly, the tendency to neglect the study of 
situations far from equilibrium has distracted organizational and management researchers 
from studying the impact of profound change in organizational theory and research. Some 
noteworthy exceptions to this phenomenon are Schumpeter (1942), Meyer (1982), Tushman 
& Romanelli (1985), and Romanelli & Tushman (1994). However, none of these previous 
studies has explicitly addressed the issue of how organizational networks reconfigure 
following exogenous and unexpected events2. We explain below how the four 
microfoundations relate to each other to explain how networks change. 
 Exogenous factors generated by random processes can be described as non-routine 
events also known as environmental jolts (Meyer, 1982). Jolts act as seismic tremors that may 
unveil hidden flaws in organizational network architectures. However, just as minor 
earthquakes rarely topple well-designed buildings resting on solid foundations, environmental 
jolts, rarely threaten the survival of soundly designed organizations with well-maintained 
environmental alignments (Meyer, 1982: 515). Jolts generate extreme and unusual uncertainty 
but at the same time they create opportunities for change. To respond to such uncertainty, 
organizations may modify their alliance portfolio in order to select ties that are effective and 
cut ineffective ties. Alliances are instrumental to responding to rapid and environmental 
change (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Powell, White, Koput, & Owen-Smith, 2005) because they 
are perceived as faster, lower cost, and more reversible than internal development or 
acquisition. Understanding the evolution of alliances can provide critical insights into how 
such ties can be better managed (Gulati, 1998). Thus, not only alliances are an effective 
means of coping with uncertainty due to their flexible nature, but the design of the alliance 
                                                             
2 The limited amount of studies dealing with how events impact organizational networks has dealt with events 
that take place within the industry boundaries (e.g., Madhavan et al., 1998). Such events can be defined as 
endogenous as opposed to the exogenous ones which take place outside the industry boundaries and on which 
none of the incumbent firms can exercise any influence. 
46 
 
network itself is a powerful tool for managers in times of instability. In sum, environmental 
changes create the “fit” necessity so that companies are faced with two basic options, break 
with the past and restructure their networks (proactive approach) or keep investing in their 
previous relationships (reactive approach). We associate the first scenario with agency 
(Sewell, 1992) while the second one is more close to inertia (Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 
2006).  
 Contingency theorists have long recognized that organizations must adjust their 
structure to changes in their environment (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Miller, 1982). The main 
assumption underlying this stream of research is that the environment is not a constant 
variable and that the firm may have to change its structure in response to environmental 
contingencies. This means that companies managers take deliberate actions to modify 
structure which in network terms equals to modifying their network structure. Managers are 
thus active change agents that promote the creation and the evolution of networks. At the 
same time, the urge to change is only created in the face of extreme events which act as 
‘occasions’ for restructuring (Madhavan, Koka, & Prescott, 1998) while generally companies 
are relatively inert and tend to pursue stability rather than instability. In other words, firms 
ties will tend to become more stable over time as partners develop routines and norms and 
habits. However, although such stability can be beneficial to a partnership at the dyad level, if 
we consider the whole firm alliance network, it could lead to threat rigidity and path 
dependence. Networks will tend to move toward equilibrium as firms exhaust their potential 
for tie activity within the existing environmental state. Significant changes in the environment 
disrupt such equilibrium as firms respond to the altered environmental state by making 
changes to their alliance portfolio (Koka et al., 2006: 726). Finally, in shaping their networks, 
actors maybe driven by opportunity which means that much networking behavior is driven by 
convenience. This suggests that firms tend to prefer linking within groups rather than across 
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them (Li & Rowley, 2002) or that they tend to form alliances with firms they have prior 
alliances with or with their partners’ partners (Gulati, 1995). 
 Using as a point of departure the Ahuja et al. (2011) framework and the Contractor, 
Wasserman, and Faust (2006) identification of families of theoretical mechanisms that have 
been used to explain the creation, maintenance, dissolution, and reconstitution of 
organizational networks, we build on literatures of exchange theory and balance theory to 
identify two constructs: homophily, and transitivity which inform how networks change and 
evolve over time due to changes in the external environment (see Table 1). We explore these 
relationships in greater detail as we unpack the underlying mechanisms enabling firms to 
change their network structure in the face of environmental jolts. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
An ‘occasion’ for change  
 Previous work in organizational research has underlined the usefulness of a theory of 
how organizational phenomena are structured (Barley, 1986). A promising line of reasoning 
suggested by this work is to investigate specific events as ‘occasions for structuring’ (Barley, 
1986). More recent work on interorganizational networks has embraced such approach 
(Madhavan, Koka, & Prescott, 1998). These authors focused on how key industry events 
acted as occasions for network restructuring. Our focus differs in one, but important, aspect. 
Quite differently from these authors, our focus is on key events that happen outside the 
industry boundaries on which incumbents can have no influence. This has important 
implications for the evolution of the network since in the first case it is possible to trace some 
predictable trajectories given the more predictable nature of industry events as compared to 
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exogenous ones while in our case incumbents are exposed to the event in an undifferentiated 
way. 
 An event focus tracks the evolution of an industry network over time by examining 
structure through various ‘windows of time’ (Doreian, 1986). The window’s length depends 
on specific events. A key advantage of this approach is that both managers and researchers are 
likely to agree that industry events provide more relevant ‘check points’ for network 
evolution than arbitrary time periods (Madhavan et al., 1998). We now turn our attention to a 
major event that radically reshaped the airline industry, which is the setting of our study: the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (also known as the “9/11”). 
 The evolution of the airline industry has been characterized by long-term business 
cycles. Since the deregulation of the airline market in the U.S. in1970, the industry has faced 
a series of events that had a profound impact on its development. Examples of those events 
include the 1991 Gulf War and the oil crisis the late seventies. However, the 9/11 is 
considered to be the more severe one. Not industry has suffered greater economic damage 
from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 than the airline industry (Ito & Lee, 2005). 
To further highlight the dramatic impact that this jolt had on the industry we report the 
following paragraph from the report produced for the U.S. Congress: 
 
“The airline industry was in financial trouble before the attacks. Most Wall 
Street analysts were projecting an overall financial loss for the industry in 
the range  of $1- 2 billion for 2001. Industry losses for the full year were 
instead over $7 billion […]. It now appears, that the events of September 11 
changed the airline industry in some fundamental ways that are not yet fully 
understood.” 
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 The impact of the 9/11 has been so severe that demand was still below pre-attack 
levels in the following two years. The event not only hit severely the US carriers but also 
affected the whole industry. In the aftermath of the jolt, North Atlantic traffic fell by 26%, 
there was a decrease in Europe of more than 10% and more than 17% in the Far East. 
Moreover, European and North American carriers reduced their capacity by 20% with similar 
adjustments occurring in other international routes. Irrespective of the direct consequences for 
commercial aviation, the 9/11 hit the world economy and made the recession inescapable. For 
the first time since 1974, all major economic regions faced a simultaneous economic 
downturn.  
 
Jolts and Homophily 
 Do dyadic relationships evolve over time? If yes, how do they change in the face of a 
major environmental jolt? The answer to this question informs our first hypothesis. In 
creating, maintaining, and dissolving social ties, the most immediate effect of organizations 
network activity is reflected on dyadic relationship. In our context, dyads are represented by 
contractual agreements among firms such as strategic alliances and joint ventures.  A key 
factor promoting the creation and the evolution of networks is the notion that actors 
purposively enact their social structures, generally referred to as agency behavior (e.g., White, 
1992). They do so by choosing or not choosing to establish new connections, by dissolving 
existing ones, or by strengthening or weakening relationships (Ahuja et al., 2011).  For 
instance, theories of social exchange (Blau, 1964) suggest that actors forge ties using a 
calculus of exchange of material or information resources.  In other words, agency behaviors 
shape network evolution through an instrumental perspective and can be more directly 
interpreted as emanating from a self-interested, utility reasoning (Ahuja et al., 2011). 
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 One of the most important perspectives on partner selection is provided by assortative 
mechanisms which speculate that network change relies on the compatibility or 
complementarity of actors attributes. A basic characteristic of dyads is that a contact between 
similar others will occur at a higher rate than among dissimilar others. Lazarsfeld and Merton 
(1954: 23) coined the term homophily to refer to “a tendency for friendships to form between 
those who are alike in some designated respect”. Literature on interpersonal networks offers a 
wide range of examples in which actors select each other based on attributes such as age, race, 
gender, religion or ethnicity. For example, in a study on age homophily, Fischer (1982) found 
that age homophilous ties tend to be more close, longer lived, to involve a larger number of 
exchanges, and to be more personal while in a study on religious homophily Fischer (1977) 
found that Jewish men in Detroit have 80% of their friendships with other Jews. Based on the 
evidence that people are more likely to connect with self-similar others, previous research has 
also demonstrated that homophilous ties are less subject to decay (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 
1954). Do the same logics apply to interorganizational ties? To answer this question we use 
evidence from alliance research. Quite differently from how individuals form their ties, firms 
often form ties with alters that possess complementary assets. For example, it has been found 
that diversity is actively pursued by firms forming ties in the investment banking industry 
(Podolny, 1994). Compared with interpersonal ties, interorganizational relationships may be 
more prone to heterophily because the trust orientation of homophily between individuals 
may be functionally substituted by contracts between organizations, and the desire for 
expressive benefits found in interpersonal networks may be absent in interfirm ones 
(Granovetter, 1985). More recently, such net distinction has been questioned giving more 
space to hypotheses predicting a balance between heterophilous and homophilous ties. For 
example, Casciaro and Lobo (2008) demonstrate that people collaborate with others that have 
complementary specializations but similar demographic traits that facilitate communication 
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and trust. Scholars are thus encouraged to abandon the search for a universalistic solution in 
favor of research that evaluates the choices and balance of homophily and heterophily in order 
to understand the conditions under which one process or the other dominates and the balance 
that is struck in different social settings (Rivera, Soderstrom, & Uzzi, 2010).   
 Firms select their partners based on some attributes such as experience, size, industry 
niche, and geographic location. If they look for similar others, they will form homophilous 
ties otherwise if they search for complementary partners they will form heterophilous ties. In 
exploring how firms choose their partners over time, one possible criterion for partner 
selection may be related to the cost of keeping a tie active contingent on the changes in the 
external environment. For example, it may be possible that firms change their partnering 
behavior in times of danger compared to times of relative tranquility. Thus, heterophilous and 
homophilous relationships can be put into a continuum in which they alternate according to 
the requirements stemming from the external environment. Drawing on previous studies 
(Gulati & Gargliulo, 1999; Shipilov, Rowley, & Aharonson, 2006) we select one of the most 
basic and important sources of homophily/heterophily: organizational size. Size is a 
particularly salient factor because it is easily observed. There are many benefits achievable 
through larger size. Greater scale implies greater efficiency in the production of goods or in 
the delivery of services, greater employee specialization based on the intricate division of 
labor, and extraction of rents from experiential learning among others (Dobrev & Carroll, 
2003). However, those firms face also specific problems related to their size, the most notable 
being inertia. Given a choice of potential alliance partners and the fact that organizations 
utilize partnerships to access resources they do not produce internally, larger firms should be 
attracted to smaller firms in order to access smaller firm’s entrepreneurial talent and capitalize 
on their flexibility (Shipilov et al., 2006).Moreover, within an industry, companies are usually 
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direct competitors with companies of the same size which also increases their likelihood of 
allying with companies of a different size.  
 However, partnerships between dissimilar others also hide uncertainties given by the 
different firms background. For example, a large firm could forge an alliance with a smaller 
one as a first step toward a subsequent acquisition of the latter. Although such event is not 
always to be seen as a negative one, it could be viewed negatively by the small firms owners 
which could result in a lack of trust and commitment, and give birth to learning races (Hamel, 
1991). On the other hand, a small firm could use horizontal alliances as a means to acquire 
valuable information and knowledge from larger companies. Relying on the fact that two big 
companies A and B would be more likely to compete rather than cooperate, the small firm 
could gain positional advantages by placing itself between them (i.e. becoming a broker).  
 Even though in times of relative tranquility, both large and small firms may be willing 
to face the “cost of dissimilarity” in order to achieve the benefits given by complementary 
alliances, in times of danger such risk-taking approach may be counterproductive. Previous 
research at the individual level has demonstrated that homophily becomes more important to 
tie activation during times of crisis or trouble (Hurlbert, Haines, & Beggs, 2000). Under 
turbulent task environments and conditions of uncertainty, actors will assume a more 
defensive posture and will be more likely to direct their networking efforts to others with a 
common background (Galaskiewicz & Shatin, 1981). Accordingly, we expect that higher 
levels of heterophily may be replaced by a tendency to form homophilous ties when there is 
high environmental uncertainty generated by a jolt. Taken together these arguments lead us to 
the following: 
 
H1: In the aftermath of an environmental jolt, firms will show a higher level of homophily 
compared to the period before and after the environmental jolt. 
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Jolts and Triads 
 Do network triads evolve over time? If yes, is their evolution affected by 
environmental jolts? Triads, subsets of three actors and the possible ties among them, play a 
key role in relating micro-structural tendencies with macro-structural patterns being at the 
intersection between dyadic relationships and overall network or parts of it (e.g., small 
worlds). Although triads have received great attention in studies on interpersonal networks, 
their role and underlying dynamics appear to be underexplored in the interorganizational 
context (Baker & Faulkner, 2002; Shipilov & Li, 2010).  The triad is a core structure of high-
order networks, and since dyads are embedded in triads, they represent a valuable layer of 
meaning for the network analyst (Madhavan, Gnyawali, & He, 2004). Work based on balance 
theory (Heider, 1958) is an important strain in triadic analysis. This theory suggests that in the 
relation of three actors or triad, balance state will occur if the algebraic multiplication of signs 
in the triad relation has the value of positive. Triads are believed to be influential for the 
formation of relationships due to the transitivity principle (Granovetter, 1973). Transitivity is 
the tendency of forming mutual ties by two actors A and B that are connected to a third 
common party C. At the dyad level this implies that prior indirect ties – at geodesic distance 
of two – turn into direct ties. The main reason why triads tend to be transitive is because 
actors strive to reduce inconsistencies and uncertainties in their social and cognitive worlds, 
and attempt to establish balances in their relationships (Heider, 1958). While this is mostly 
true in the case of interpersonal networks, in interfirm networks transitive triads are justified 
by the desire of the parties involved to achieve joint value creation, such as economies of 
scale (Madhavan et al., 2004). The more triads become transitive, the higher the level of the 
interconnectedness will be. A tendency toward closure produces dense cliques of strongly 
interconnected actors in the network. Groups of strongly interconnected actors generally show 
a high level of trust and commitment (Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997). The underlying 
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assumption is that the selection of relationships, the maintenance of existing ones, and the 
dissolution of old ones is conditioned by trust, information, and opportunities for interaction 
that are structured by the network (Rivera, Soderstrom, & Uzzi, 2010). 
 The above arguments have received support in previous studies. For instance, 
Newman (2001) documented that those scientists who have had common co-authors were 
more likely to collaborate and form relationships over time than those who did not share 
authorship. In another study, Burt (1999) concluded that triads were more likely to be 
cohesive and balanced when there is trust between three actors. At the interfirm level, 
transitive triads have been found within the same geographical regions and within the same 
technological classes in the global steel industry (Madhavan et al., 2004). Consequently, it 
seems reasonable to suggest that triadic transitivity should reinforce path dependent pressures 
within dyads, that is the higher is the frequency of prior collaborations between two actors 
who have a common third party, the more likely should be that the two actors continue 
cooperating with each other while collaborating with the third party at the same time. 
 Given the above arguments, it seems reasonable to expect that, as time passes and an 
industry becomes more mature, transitive triads will increase. However, this endogenous 
assumption of linearity maybe questioned when we take into account the role that 
environmental influences may have on triads formation or dissolution. Despite the external 
environment plays an important role in shaping network structure, in previous research on 
triads the “within-the-network” perspective, which views the shape and the structure of the 
network in a prior time period, has prevailed as the focal predictor of network change (Stuart 
& Sorenson, 2007). We complement and expand literature on network change at the triadic 
level by exploring the impact of environmental jolts on triads over time.  Environmental 
pressures create the need of alignment for organizational networks. The higher those 
pressures, the more difficult it would be for firms to maintain structures that were suitable in 
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the previous context. Thus, in this paper, we argue that triads may evolve in a punctuated 
way. Because dyadic relationships that share a common party will tend to become triads over 
time due to inertia and path dependence, the overall transitivity will tend to increase. In other 
words, firms are constrained in their future tie activity by their existing networks and there 
will be relatively few degrees of freedom for network activity as networks become more 
clustered. Changes in the environment disrupt such equilibrium as firms respond to the altered 
environmental state by modifying their network structure (Koha, Madhavan, & Prescott, 
2006). In that context, shocks in the external environment may render previous networking 
behavior incompatible with the new scenario and push toward more radical reconfiguration of 
firms’ alliance networks. For instance, in a study of creative artists who collaborated in the 
creation of Broadway musicals between 1877 and 1995, Uzzi & Spiro (2005) found that 
clustering decreased significantly after a shock perturbed the network. The authors suggest 
that shocks may weaken common ties to the same third party or make interaction with a 
common third party less predictable. In a similar fashion, Shipilov (2005) argues that 
embedded ties can become liabilities when external shocks to an industry render previous 
social relationships obsolete. In contrast to those arguments, we suggest that for interfirm 
linkages, a shock may push firms to search for greater stability and acquaintances provided by 
less distant partners in the network. By closing their open triads in times of high 
environmental turbulence, firms engage in competition and uncertainty reduction actions. On 
the one hand, transitivity could mitigate the uncertainties hidden in open triads (i.e., less 
opportunistic behavior, more control on partner’s activity). On the other hand, in a highly 
unstable and less munificent environment, it would be reasonable to co-opt more rivals in 
order to reduce competitive pressures. Accordingly, we argue for a conservative posture 
during a major upheaval as a mechanism to insulate and buffer firms from the external 
uncertainties. Hence:  
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H2: In the aftermath of an environmental jolt, triads will show a higher tendency toward 
transitivity compared to the period before and after the environmental jolt. 
 
METHODS 
 
Data 
 We tested our hypotheses using longitudinal data on alliances formed in the global 
airline industry between 1998 and 2006. We identified an alliance as any durable 
collaborative activity that involved exchange of resources between firms (Ahuja, 2000). All 
airlines that had formed at least one alliance during the period of our study were included in 
the database. Data on airline alliances and their evolution are collected through several issues 
of the Airline Business magazine. These issues contain data on all major forms of cooperative 
relationships (e.g., blocked seat, code-sharing, marketing) but exclude cooperation on 
frequent flyer programs as well as alliances among charter and cargo carriers which are not 
the focus of this study. We used these data to build a series of sociomatrices. A particular 
matrix entry Xij corresponds to an active tie between an airline in row i and an airline in row j. 
Thus, inactive alliances in the study period were excluded. Forming year-wise matrixes is 
necessary in order to create a panel dataset for the purpose of year-wise testing of hypotheses. 
Such approach is also particularly indicated for testing environmental change hypotheses 
(Koka & Prescott, 2008). The database includes information on individual airlines observed 
over time. The final sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 264 airlines, including 
companies that have disappeared from the business arena and those that were founded during 
the analysis period. To this day, these carriers represent almost 80 percent of the total world 
passenger traffic, covering more than 80 countries in the world. 
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Estimation Procedure 
 In order to test how homophily and transitivity drive the dynamics of the network, we 
apply a stochastic network simulation procedure across the nine observations between the 
period 1998-2006. We do so by using the program SIENA (Simulation Investigation for 
Empirical Network Analysis), as developed by Snijders (2001). This program has been 
specifically designed for the statistical analysis of dynamic networks. Moreover, SIENA fills 
a gap by allowing researchers to apply a dynamic or evolutionary approach to social network 
analysis while also focusing on individual actors in organization research (Felin & Foss, 
2005).  
 SIENA treats the evolution of the network as driven by the changes the actors make in 
their outgoing ties, that is the ties they send to other actors, one at a time. One such change 
may consist either of establishing a new tie or withdrawing an existing one. The actors are 
assumed to add or withdraw their outgoing ties guided by their preferences for alternative 
local configurations of the network, formalized in a hypothesized random utility function. 
Choosing a model of the evolution of the network is equivalent to selecting the components of 
the utility function that underlies the actors’ choices. 
 The parameters associated to the components of the utility function correspond to the 
hypothesized dynamical tendencies of the network; they are estimated by means of an 
iterative procedure, that implies many simulations of the evolution of the network between 
consecutive observations, until convergence on a set of parameter estimates is obtained. 
Based on these parameter estimates, a last series of simulations is performed which produces 
an estimate of the standard errors. 
 The internal logic of SIENA models implies at least the estimation of a number of rate 
parameters, and the degree parameter. A rate parameter is estimated for each period between 
consecutive observations of the network; it measures how frequently actors change their 
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outgoing ties. In other words, rate parameters measure the speed of the change of the network 
in each period. Modeling the evolution of a network across m discrete observations implies 
then the estimation of m-1 rate parameters. Our models include three rate parameters for the 
periods 1998-1999, 1999-2000, 2000-2001, two for the periods 2001-2002 and 2002-2003, 
and three for the periods 2003-2004, 2004-2005, and 2005-2006. 
 The inclusion of the degree parameter is needed to condition on the observed density 
of the network (the number of ties) while assessing higher order structural features. This is 
important because, for instance, the observation of a certain number of transitive triplets could 
be trivial in a network with a very high density, while in a sparse network (low density) it 
could well indicate an important structural mechanism of the network’s evolution. 
 Other parameters are almost always included in SIENA models not because they are 
intrinsic to the model’s logic, but because they reflect the most classical and widely observed 
structural tendencies of networks. Among them we focus on transitive triads. Transitive 
closure involves triples of actors at the micro-level, and induces important macro-structural 
implications (Granovetter, 1973). In longitudinal modeling transitive closure can be shown to 
be the outcome of a number of different (though not exclusive) micro-mechanisms, that 
correspond to distinct SIENA parameters. In this study we test for the transitivity parameter. 
Finally, one of the important features provided by SIENA is that it allows the membership of 
the network to change across the observations. The membership of our network changed 
during the observation period through the entry and the exit of some players. In the analyses 
these changes were dealt with by setting to structural zeros the embedded ties that involved a 
firm not yet in the network, as described in Snijders, Steglich, Schweinberger, & Huisman 
(2008). 
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Variables 
Rate of change. This variable indicates the average number of tie changes per actor between 
two consecutive waves. In particular, we identified three waves in the period before (1998-
2001) and three waves in the period after the environmental jolt (2003-2006) while the jolt 
period consisted of two waves (2001-2003). 
 
Homophily. A tie between two actors that share a common attribute may be more likely to 
take place. We selected firm size as our measure to test homophily selection effects.  
 
Firm size. Firm size was operationalized as the natural logarithm of the fleet size, which is a 
frequently used indicator for size in the airline industry. Other measures could have been used 
in place of fleet size such as the number of employees, total assets or number of clients 
served. Concern about what measure of size should be used is especially important in cross-
industry studies (Kimberly, 1976), but for studies confined to a single industry, the effects of 
size can be more easily disentangled (Blau & Schoenherr, 1971). 
 
Transitive triads. The variable transitive triads is operationalized as transitivity or the 
tendency of friends of friends to become friends. In our context, this means the tendency of 
forming alliances with partners’ partners. 
 
Environmental jolt. The dummy variable environmental jolt took the value of 1 for the years 
2001, 2002, and 2003 and 0 otherwise. Extending the effects of the jolt for a period of three 
years is a judgment based on previous studies (Madhavan et al., 1998; Koka & Prescott, 2008; 
Wan & Yiu, 2009) and industry evidence. The global economic downturn that began at the 
end of 2000 with the bursting of the dot.com bubble, continued through 2003. The events of 
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September 11, 2001 exacerbated pessimism about the future and spread from the United 
States to other countries as described in business and trade journals (Polzehl, Spokoiny, & 
Starica, 2004). After 9/11 attacks, global demand for air travel collapsed immediately. The 
downturn of 2001 was perceived as the worst airline crisis ever, resulting in a “perfect storm” 
(Franke & John, 2011). Although people commenced flying shortly after, it was not until 
2004 when pre-jolt demand level was reached. Recovery was also delayed due also to the 
2003 pandemic threat of SARS which further increased our confidence in our 3-year window 
choice. 
 
RESULTS 
 Table 1 shows correlations. Table 2 shows the results of the model for the whole 
period of analysis. The parameter transitive triads is positive and significant (0.4457, p< 0.05) 
which means that actors have a tendency towards network closure or transitivity. Our 
parameter for homophily, fleet size similarity, is negative and significant (-0.5061, p<0.05) 
which suggests that overall the firms in our sample have a tendency toward the creation of 
heterophilous ties. The dummy variable during which represents the jolt period is positive and 
significant (0.1531, p<0.05). This result indicates that there is a tendency to form more ties 
during the jolt period compared to the periods of more tranquility. Finally the interaction 
between fleet size and the dummy during is positive and significant (0.9468, p<0.05). This 
result is quite relevant since it demonstrates that airlines are more prone to form homophilous 
ties in the jolt period.  
 Table 3 shows the results of the models for the three periods: before, during and after 
the environmental jolt. In the control models (models 1, 3, and 5), we see the rate scores for 
each period, indicating the average number of tie changes per actor between consecutive 
waves. The scores are all significant and relatively constant for the whole period with two 
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exceptions: the periods 2002-2003 and 2005-2006. For our study the result in the period 
2002-2003 (2.7957, p<0.05) is particularly interesting. This decrease in the rate score may be 
due to the fact that following the jolt on average there will be less tie changes due to lower 
munificence and higher uncertainty. In other words, companies will be less akin to 
experiment with their ties. The parameter transitive triads is always significant and positive 
which confirms the result reported for the whole model in table 2. However, transitivity does 
not evolve in a linear fashion but in a punctuated way. Following the jolt, transitivity 
increases (0.4555, p<0.05) compared to the before period (0.3858, p<0.05) but then decreases 
again in the subsequent period (0.4085, p<0.05). These results confirm hypothesis 2. In 
models 2, 4, and 6 we introduce fleet size and fleet size similarity (homophily). The size 
parameter is not significant in each of the three periods although in the first period is negative 
and then positive in the following two periods which indicates that before the jolt, bigger 
airlines are less likely to take part in new alliances while the opposite happens after a jolt 
takes place. The estimation of homophily based on firm size clearly indicates that in the jolt 
period firms of the same size are more likely to form alliances (1.1748, p<0.05)  while the 
coefficient is negative and significant before the jolt (-1.2714, p<0.05)  which suggests that 
firms are more likely to establish new ties on the basis of heterophily. Thus, hypothesis 1 is 
confirmed.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Empirical research on network dynamics has been quite sparse due to practical 
difficulties (e.g. collection of extensive and broad longitudinal network data) and a lack of 
attention both on the theoretical and the econometric handling of endogeneity problems 
(Ahuja et al., 2011). On the other hand, given a network structure or network position, 
scholars have produced a conspicuous amount of theoretical and empirical contributions on 
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the effects of organizational networks. However, without a comprehension of the logic that 
drives network creation, and evolution, scholarly understanding of its outcomes remains 
incomplete (Salancik, 1995, words in italics added). Accordingly, in this paper, we 
instrumentally used the concept of environmental jolts to identify what are the forces 
operating behind network evolution. This approach requires overcoming the static approach 
that has typically characterized network studies while embracing a temporal perspective. To 
that respect, taking into account the contingency of time becomes particularly relevant for 
separating periods of turbulence from periods of relative tranquility.  
 Moreover, following recent theoretical contributions (Kilduff, Tsai, & Hanke, 2006), 
we argue for a dynamic stability approach by supporting the argument that organizational 
networks change constantly in some respects and yet remain stable in other respects. For 
example, a change at the dyadic level does not automatically produce a change at the triadic 
level. Yet it may be that a small change at the local level – one firm adding an alliance to its 
portfolio, for example – can have global implications for change for the whole network – by 
bringing disconnected clusters of firms much closer together, for instance. Given that shocks 
tend to perturb the system at different times, companies and industries are faced with periods 
of tranquility punctuated by disruptions. If we are to understand the evolutionary trajectories 
of network evolution, then a dynamic stability approach that considers social networks as sets 
of interlinked actors continuously forming and reforming may be helpful. Networks can be a 
source of opportunity (Burt, 1992) but also a trap (Benassi & Gargiulo, 2000) and to a certain 
extent actors can “play” with their ties to maximize the returns they can gain from them. A 
major shock can modify radically the competitive landscape and the way firms perceive their 
ties. Evidence shows that shocks are increasingly becoming a less rare phenomenon. Despite 
that, most of our theorizing is often based on an implicit assumption of stability. Whereas 
actors respond to the constraints and opportunities of the network in many ways, empirical 
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network research rarely considers the most direct line of attack on a constraining network – to 
change the network itself (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994). Our study aims at contributing to 
this small but growing line of research. 
 Our results provide evidence that environmental jolts can be an important predictor of 
network change at more than one level of analysis. At the dyad level, we found that actors of 
same size are less likely to form ties when the environment is stable. This result confirms that 
the motives guiding alliance formation differ from those guiding the formation of 
interpersonal ties. Individuals are more likely to connect with other individuals that share 
common attributes such age, gender, and religion. On the other hand, alliance formation is 
mainly driven by the desire to obtain complementary assets. However, our data suggest that 
this situation changes in the face of an environmental jolt. Sharing a common attribute, 
organizational size in our case, may be viewed positively during a jolt. In the case of size, 
companies of same size, which would usually be competitors, may find it more convenient to 
form an alliance in an effort to reduce uncertainty and competition. In other words, 
eliminating some of the competitive pressures within the industry would compensate for the 
increased pressures coming from an unstable external environment. This finding provides an 
important contribution to interfirm partner selection literature by suggesting that firms use 
coopetitive logics in designing their alliance strategy. In times of danger firms will become 
more cooperative as opposed to periods of higher tranquility in which competitive logics 
prevail. At the triad level, we find evidence that there is a tendency toward transitivity over 
time. Firms tend to modify their alliance portfolio by adding or removing ties. Our results 
suggest that there will be a higher tendency toward addition rather than deletion of ties over 
time, may be due to inertia and cost of searching new partners to replace old ones. However, 
in line with previous research (Uzzi & Spiro, 2005), our study suggests that triads evolve in a 
punctuated way. In particular, we find that an environmental jolt will lead firms to close their 
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triads. In times of crisis firms’ alliance activity will be more directed toward firms that are 
closer to them (i.e. less geodesically distant). Thus, referrals and acquaintances seem to be 
particularly important during an environmental jolt. Although there is a plethora of studies on 
interpersonal networks analyzing the triadic microstructure, research on interfirm networks 
focusing on triads is still limited and mostly cross-sectional in nature. More studies examining 
structural tendencies over time are needed and our study is one of the first contributions in 
that direction.  
 This paper also provides important methodological contributions.  First, we address 
the issue of endogeneity and direction of causality. Failures to account for endogeneity, 
direction of causality, and unobserved heterogeneity have all been raised as possible sources 
of methodological error in network research (Ahuja, 2007; Aral & Van Alstyne, 2011). 
Although the idea that structural advantages are available to occupants of certain network 
positions is widely accepted, this idea is based on cross-sectional studies (Baum & Rowley, 
2008). In reality, it is possible that some advantages precede, rather than follow, network 
positions (Ahuja et al., 2011). Adopting a longitudinal research design has been recently 
suggested as a way to separate cause and effect. Moreover, scholars have been encouraged to 
use exogenous shocks to identify effects. To that respect, our study is one of the very first in  
network research to explicitly account for endogeneity by using a natural experiment in a 
longitudinal context.  
 Second, to obtain accurate estimates of the network’s effects on behavior, it becomes 
important to control for the econometric implications of network change by also using 
appropriate statistical procedures. To that respect, the development of computer simulation 
models of network evolution, such as SIENA, is a promising area of research which also 
facilitates the testing of models that relate multilevel explanatory variables to tie-level 
outcomes. 
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 Finally, this study also provides a key managerial insight. The fact that the 
morphology of an alliance network changes contingent on environmental changes suggests 
that alliance managers should continuously scan the environment trying to foresee its changes 
and adapt to them. Horizontal alliances are one of the ways in which a firm can diversify risk. 
Thus, in times of danger, alliances help diversify risk by sharing it with partners. Although 
shocks are unexpected events, companies should learn from previous jolts in order to make 
better strategies and easier recovery from future ones. In network terms this means that 
managers should structure their alliance portfolio in a flexible way - not being trapped in their 
own nets - so that they can for instance easily switch from heterophilous to homophilous ties 
in the face of an environmental jolt. In practice, the use of simulation and forecasting tools 
could be of great help in modeling future scenarios that include the occurrence of unusual 
events. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 This study is not without limitations. The idiosyncrasy of the event we chose to 
conduct our natural experiment may put some limits to the generalizability of our results. 
Other forms of environmental jolts such as natural disasters or wars may be more or less 
likely to produce the same results. Moreover, this study focuses only on a single, and 
negative, exogenous event while being silent on the impact of multiple, positive or negative, 
exogenous or endogenous, events on network restructuring. Future studies could include 
different types of jolts over a longer time span.  
 Another caveat is given by the empirical setting we chose. Each industry has its own 
peculiarities which may hinder our ability to extend our findings to other settings in a 
normative way. In other words, the patterns found in our study may not replicate in a different 
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setting. Less bureaucratic or younger industries as well as manufacturing industries could be 
used in future research to test whether our results hold in other empirical settings. 
 Although our study represents one of the few contributions conceptualizing and 
empirically testing a multilevel framework of network change, future studies could include 
more levels (e.g, small world and whole networks) as well as different variables from the ones 
we have chosen at the pair- and the triad-level. For example, studies focusing on dyads could 
examine the impact of structural equivalence on alliance formation and deletion over time.  
 Furthermore, interesting results could emerge from the interactions between different 
levels of analysis. Using the variables we identified in this paper, future research could 
explore: 1) whether transitive triads between firms sharing a common attribute are more likely 
to happen during an environmental jolt, 2) whether homophilous ties are more likely when 
two firms share a common partner during an environmental jolt. 
 In focusing on the antecedents of network change, we have kept silent on the 
performance consequences. A focus on both the antecedents and the consequences may 
provide a broader and more complete picture of interfirm network evolution. From a practical 
standpoint, two-stage models could be employed to test such a comprehensive model of 
network dynamics. 
 In summary, bridging different levels of analysis and theoretical approaches, we 
provided an empirically testable framework that deals with how the environment shapes 
network evolution. We hope our study encourages scholars to undertake more research in 
situations far from equilibrium and explore their effects on the evolution of networks. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1. Summary of the Theoretical Model  
 
Hypothesis Variable Theory Micro foundations 
Illustrative prediction Measure 
1 Dyadic level Exchange theory Agency 
Mutual ties between 
actors with similar 
attributes have a higher 
probability of occurring 
Homophily 
2 Triadic level Balance theory Opportunity 
Friends of friends are 
more likely to form ties 
with each other leading 
to triad closure 
Transitivity 
- Environment - Exogenous factors - Environmental Jolts 
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Table 2. Correlations 
 
    
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. Degree         
2. Transitive triads -0,464        
3. Fleet size 0,029 -0,278       
4. Fleet size similarità 0,072 -0,157 0,692      
5. Dummy During (2001-2003) 0,111 0,021 -0,064 -0,110     
6. Dummy After (2003-2006) 0,102 -0,028 0,097 0,055 0,434    
7. Interaction Fleet size similarity × Dummy During (2001-2003) 0,063 -0,192 0,178 0,247 -0,026 0,025   
8. Interaction Fleet size similarity × Dummy After (2003-2006) 0,031 -0,016 -0,055 0,098 -0,013 -0,008 0,206   
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Table 3. Estimates for the three periods (standard errors in parentheses) 
  1998-2006 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Rate 1998-1999 4,6269* (0,2953) 4,6724* (0,3011) 
Rate 1999-2000 4,0012* (0,2737) 4,0236* (0,2763) 
Rate 2000-2001 3,6487* (0,2582) 3,6484* (0,2440) 
Rate 2001-2002 3,8421* (0,2619) 3,6974* (0,2535) 
Rate 2002-2003 2,6691* (0,2029) 2,6056* (0,1993) 
Rate 2003-2004 4,3274* (0,2805) 4,3240* (0,2979) 
Rate 2004-2005 2,2471* (0,2102) 2,2448* (0,2075) 
Rate 2005-2006 5,3899* (0,3737) 5,3696* (0,3819) 
Degree -1,6120* (0,0243) -1,6037* (0,0229) 
Transitive triads 0,4462* (0,0110) 0,4457* (0,0115) 
Fleet size 0,0002 (0,0010) 0,0002 (0,0010) 
Fleet size similarità -0,5013* (0,1714) -0,5061* (0,1842) 
Dummy During (2001-2003)   0,1531* (0,0502) 
Dummy After (2003-2006)   0,0629 (0,0407) 
interaction 
Fleet size similarity × Dummy During (2001-2003)   0,9468* (0,3239) 
interaction 
Fleet size similarity × Dummy After (2003-2006)     0,0540 (0,2259) 
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Table 4. Estimates for the three periods (standard errors in parentheses) 
 
  1. BEFORE (1998-2001) 2. DURING (2001-2003) 3. AFTER (2003-2006) 
Rate 1 4,7224* (0,2982) 4,7783* (0,2978) 4,1176* (0,2767) 4,1290* (0,2737) 4,6041* (0,2989) 4,6038* (0,2888) 
Rate 2 4,0636* (0,2825) 4,1157* (0,2822) 2,7957* (0,2203) 2,8386* (0,2245) 2,3276* (0,2176) 2,3617* (0,2169) 
Rate 3 3,7225* (0,2532) 3,7555* (0,2585) - - - - 5,5341* (0,3690) 5,5593* (0,3865) 
Degree -1,5361* (0,0311) -1,5104* (0,0304) -1,3731* (0,0460) -1,3793* (0,0481) -1,4541* (0,0334) -1,4563* (0,0355) 
Transitive triads 0,3858* (0,0166) 0,3749* (0,0173) 0,4544* (0,0247) 0,4395* (0,0303) 0,4085* (0,0154) 0,4001* (0,0155) 
Fleet size   -0,0011 (0,0016)    0,0023 (0,0042)   0,0005 (0,0018) 
Fleet size similarity     -1,2714* (0,2324)     1,1748* (0,5263)     -0,3757 (0,2281) 
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ENVIRONMENTAL JOLTS, FIRM SIZE, AND THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN BROKERAGE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE3 
 
Presented at: 
 Strategic Management Society Conference, Miami, FL, USA, 2011 
 
 
Abstract. We treat September 11 terrorist attacks as a natural experiment to investigate how 
dramatic changes in the external environment can affect the relationship between firms’ 
position in alliance networks and their performance in the global airline industry. We contend 
that, all else being equal, firms that adopt a brokerage posture will have positive returns. 
However, we find that in the face of an environmental jolt brokerage relates negatively to firm 
performance. Furthermore, we argue that the negative relationship between brokerage and 
performance during an environmental jolt is more significant for larger firms. Our findings 
indicate the importance of both environmental and firm level attributes for the design of 
alliance networks and how these affect operational returns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
3 An earlier version of this paper has classified as finalist for the “Best Conference PhD Paper Prize” and been 
nominated for the “Best Conference Paper Prize” and the “Best Conference Paper Prize for Practice 
Implications” at the 2011 SMS Conference. 
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Environmental Jolts, Firm Size, and the Relationship Between Brokerage and Firm 
Performance 
 
ABSTRACT 
We treat September 11 terrorist attacks as a natural experiment to investigate how dramatic 
changes in the external environment can affect the relationship between firms’ position in 
alliance networks and their performance in the global airline industry. We contend that, all 
else being equal, firms that adopt a brokerage posture will have positive returns. However, we 
find that in the face of an environmental jolt brokerage relates negatively to firm performance. 
Furthermore, we argue that the negative relationship between brokerage and performance 
during an environmental jolt is more significant for larger firms. Our findings indicate the 
importance of both environmental and firm level attributes for the design of alliance networks 
and how these affect operational returns. 
 
Keywords: environmental jolt; interfirm networks; brokerage; airline industry 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The importance of alliances and networks has greatly increased during the last decade 
(Harbison & Pekar,1998; Hagedoorn & Osborn, 1997). Strategic alliance research has become 
something of an industry, challenging the traditional centrality of the firm as a focus for 
research (Koza & Lewin, 1998). Faced with growing uncertainty and lack of resources, a 
rising number of companies has recognized the importance of cooperation. As a result, many 
firms today are embedded in a dense network of interorganizational relationships with 
customers, suppliers, competitors and complementors (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; 
Gomes-Casseres, 1996). Using the network perspective, researchers have focused either on 
the antecedents or on the consequences of interorganizational networks. Among those who 
have focused on the consequences of interorganizational networks, attention has been paid to 
the effects of networks on the mimetic adoption of practices (Haunschild & Beckman, 1998), 
innovation (Ahuja, 2000; Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000), survival (Miner, Amburgey, 
& Sterns, 1990) and performance (Rowley, Behrens, & Krachardt, 2000). Performance has 
77 
 
been measured, among others, as innovation output, patenting success, revenue growth, and 
R&D expenditure (Ahuja, 2000; Baum et al., 2000; Stuart, 2000).  
 Despite the large number of studies exploring the consequences of interorganizational 
networks, only a relatively small number of them has used a longitudinal approach, leaving 
the question of how changes in network ties affect organizational performance open to further 
inquiry (Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006). Moreover, network evolution (i.e., change) has 
been assumed to happen endogenously assuming that the network structure in which the firm 
is embedded affects the opportunities available to the firm to strategically position itself 
within the network (Koka, Madhavan, & Prescott, 2006). In its most notable explication, the 
evolutionary view of networks emphasizes network structure as its own context for evolution 
(Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). As a result, we still know very little about how firms respond to 
environmental stimuli exogenous to the network and with which consequences for their 
performance. To fill this void, we introduce the concept of environmental jolts, defined as 
transient perturbations whose occurrences are difficult to foresee and whose impacts on 
organizations are disruptive and potentially inimical (Meyer, 1982). Researchers looking at 
the impact of environmental contingencies on network position – performance relationship 
have typically focused on endogenous jolts, which take place inside the industry boundaries. 
The impact of an exogenous shock on such relationship needs yet to be explored. Moreover, 
since we believe that the possibility that a network position augments firm performance may 
be also a function of firm attributes, we introduce the concept of firm size.  
 Given the above arguments, we posit that external, as well as internal, factors act as 
occasions for firms to take advantage of the ensuing changes to structure their ego networks 
in order to strengthen their position in the network. Our approach to studying network change 
as a result of both external and internal pressures is similar to the concept of dynamic strategic 
fit (Zajac, Kraatz, & Bresser, 2000). Drawing on contingency and resource-based arguments, 
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we seek to identify multilevel contingencies that should predict changes in a firm’s network 
strategy and the performance implications of such changes. To that respect, research has 
emphasized two distinct yet interrelated approaches on how firms can structure their 
networks, namely brokerage and closure. Instead of asking if the two aforementioned network 
options affect firm performance we focus on a different question: what is the impact of 
external and internal stimuli on the relationship between network structure and firm 
performance? We address this question by focusing on two contingencies at the environment 
(environmental jolt), and the firm (firm size) levels which we argue interact with network 
structure decisions that affect firm performance. The relationships between characteristics of 
open networks, moderating variables, and underlying factors are presented in Table 1. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
 The objective of this paper is threefold. First, we seek to contribute to a theory of 
organizational adaptation that takes into account the presence of exceptional events. Second, 
we aim to offer new insights and enrich the discourse on the performance consequences of 
network dynamics by suggesting which are the most effective ways to structure an alliance 
portfolio and under which conditions. To do so, we introduce firm-, and environment-level 
factors following recent trends (Burt, 2000; Koka & Prescott, 2008) and recent calls 
(Shipilov, 2006) in the study of the consequences of interorganizational networks. Finally, we 
seek to expand the scope of strategic management research by utilizing a natural experiment. 
Although this is not the first study using a natural experiment approach (e.g, Park & Mezias, 
2005), our study is one of the few combining it with a network approach.  
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 The airline industry provides an opportunity to empirically test our hypotheses over 
the period 1998-2006. Airlines utilize bilateral and multilateral alliances in order to meet the 
ever increasing demand for seamless travel and to share costs and revenues. These networks 
consist of horizontal alliances, which allows us to mitigate some of the effects power-related 
factors can play in networks containing a dominant player among several overly-dependent 
suppliers or distributors (Rowley et al., 2000). 
 The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly review literature on 
strategic change and structural holes and present the hypotheses. After we describe the 
empirical setting, the data, and the variables, we present the model and the method and the 
results of the analyses. We finish by discussing the main implications of the findings, the 
conclusions that follow from them and the limitations and possible extensions of the present 
study. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 Research in both organization theory and business policy has outlined the importance 
of context as a factor to consider in order to understand relationships between a firm’s 
strategies and its performance (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Accordingly, the appropriateness of 
a firm’s strategy can be defined in term of its fit, match, or congruence with the 
environmental or organizational contingencies facing the firm (Andrews, 1971; Hofer & 
Schendel, 1978). The pursuit of such fit has been traditionally viewed as having desirable 
performance implications (Miles & Snow, 1994). Typically the notion of fit has been 
associated with contingency based studies (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). In a similar vein, 
industrial organization scholars have focused on understanding the impact of a firm’s 
environment on performance (Porter, 1980). In sum, these studies have put the emphasis on 
the OT (opportunities and threats) part of the SWOT framework leaving almost unexplored 
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the SW (strengths and weaknesses) part. In an attempt to shed more light on the sources of 
competitive advantage, the resource-based model has focused on internal analyses of 
organizational strengths and weaknesses. The main assumption of RBV studies is that firms 
within an industry possess heterogeneous resources and that superior rents come from such 
heterogeneity (Barney, 1991). Although there is little doubt that both approaches have been 
very fruitful in clarifying our understanding of sources of sustained competitive advantage, 
both the industry and resource-based perspectives have historically emphasized static 
equilibria (Zajac et al., 2000). We believe that when the assumption of equilibrium is broken, 
both the internal and the external perspectives become more interesting and powerful 
predictors of strategic change.  
 Change can happen at many levels, including the organization, the organization’s 
alliance portfolio, the whole network or an industry. In this study, our interest is in viewing 
how interfirm networks change. Moreover, the nature of change can also differ. Change has 
been portrayed both as a continuous organizational process (March, 1981) and as brief 
episodes interspersed between long periods of stability and inertia (Miller & Friesen, 1984). 
Change happens in two fundamentally different modes (Meyer, Brooks, & Goes, 1990). 
Continuous, or first-order change, occurs within a stable system that itself remains 
unchanged. Discontinuous, or second-order change, transforms fundamental properties or 
states of the system. First-order change is incremental or evolutionary while second-order 
change is said to be of a quantum nature because many elements change in a major or a minor 
way within a brief interval. Quantum changes are defined as revolutionary when they 
radically transform many elements of the structure. 
 Network change has usually been regarded as an evolutionary process with main 
attention being paid to change through gradual and incremental steps as network actors 
interact and adapt to each other (Halinen, Salmi, & Havila, 1999). Quite opposite to that view, 
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industry evidence seems to suggest that industries are subject to periods of incremental 
change that are interrupted by merger waves, multiple bankruptcies or peaks in the formation 
of alliances among industry players. Examples of such industries include healthcare, 
semiconductors, airlines and banking.  
 Received literature offers the possibility to capture both evolutionary and 
revolutionary change in the analysis of network change through the punctuated equilibrium 
model. According to this model, systems evolve alternating periods of equilibrium, in which 
persistent underlying structures permit only incremental change, and periods of revolution, in 
which these underlying structures are fundamentally altered (Gersick, 1991). Organizational 
theorists who have adopted the punctuated-equilibrium perspective propose that 
organizational evolution has two distinct and recurring phases: 1) long periods of quasi-
equilibrium, during which organizations make only incremental changes in structure and 
activities, and 2) brief periods of disequilibrium, during which many new organizations 
appear and many existing ones undergo deep change (Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Miner, 
Amburgey, & Sterns, 1990; Haveman, Russo, & Meyer, 2001). In line with previous research 
that argues that the evolution of some alliances may be akin to a punctuated equilibrium 
model in which there may be discrete stages that occur due to discontinuous changes in the 
environment (Gray & Yan, 1997; Gulati 1998), we think that this model may be also fruitful 
for the study of interfirm networks. 
 Since our interest is to explain why some companies do perform better than others, 
and under which circumstances, we relate the above arguments to the contingency approach 
that has focused on explaining firm performance as a function of fit between organizational 
structure and environmental characteristics (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Accordingly, firms 
need to strategically design their networks if they are to acquire the appropriate skills and 
capabilities in the changed environment. Any mismatch between the needs of the environment 
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and the firm’s alliance position could have serious performance implications (Koka & 
Prescott, 2008: 643). However, considering only the impact of the external environment to 
explain profitability differences among competitors would be equal to take into account only 
the OT part of the SWOT framework. Consequently, we need to take into account also a 
firm’s key resources. One of these resources is the network itself. Previous research has 
typically considered networks as conduits of resources. We believe that networks are more 
than pipes. Notable exceptions in the networks literature that support our position are 
Madhavan, Koka and Prescott (1998) and Gulati (1999). We consider interfirm networks as a 
strategic resource that managers can use to improve a firm’s positional advantage, and 
bargaining power, with respect to its competitors. Moreover, an important firm attribute that 
can dictate the depth of a firm’s strategic maneuvering is the size a firm has. Since designing 
networks is a strategy on its own, the amount of resources a firm can invest on structuring its 
network will also have an impact on its ability to obtain superior rents.   
 We discuss these relationships in greater detail as we unpack the underlying 
mechanisms that influence a firm’s ability to gain advantage from network positions rich in 
structural holes. 
 
Environmental Jolts 
 The first contingency we examine is at the environment level. In particular we study 
the performance implications of changes in network positioning following exogenous 
disruptions which we define as environmental jolts. Before moving into our discussion, it is 
important to clarify more in deep what we intend for exogenous environmental jolts. Previous 
literature has posed significant attention to distinguishing between what is exogenous and 
endogenous (e.g. Di Maggio & Powell, 1983; Hannan & Freeman, 1989). The main reasoning 
behind those studies is that exogenous or endogenous forces have the power to modify 
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organizational and in some occasions industry boundaries. Although shocks have been also 
discussed in those theoretical frameworks, we found less evidence and more confusion on the 
definitions of exogenous and endogenous shocks. To provide a more nuanced distinction we 
propose a categorization of jolts along two dimensions namely 1) the influence incumbents 
can exercise on a disruptive event and 2) the locus in which the jolt takes place (see table 2).  
 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
 Endogenous jolts happen by definition inside the industry boundaries and are 
influenced by the incumbent firms. Examples of events on which incumbents can exert a 
significant impact are technological changes and the entry of new competitors or the exit of 
significant players from the market. On the other hand, there are events on which incumbents 
can play a less significant role but can still exercise some influence. ‘Occasions’ such as a 
regulatory initiative that removes strategic barriers are coordinated and orchestrated through a 
lobbying process, usually conducted dominant firms (Madhavan et al., 1998). Environmental 
jolts that incumbents experience in an unanticipated manner and on which they have not any 
influence are exogenous by nature. Examples of exogenous jolts, which represent the focus of 
this study, include but are not limited to: wars, oil shocks, terrorist attacks, natural disasters, 
and pandemics. 
 Many contributors have suggested that alliances are an effective means to cope with 
environmental uncertainties (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Accordingly, the way a firm structures its sets of alliances, i.e. the ego network, plays an 
important role in insulating the effects of an environmental jolt. Previous literature has 
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identified two main network strategies, brokerage and closure, and studied their impact on 
firms performance. One of the most widely used theoretical lenses to examine the options for 
configuring the structure of a firm’s relationships with its partners is the “open network” 
perspective (Burt, 1992). Advocates of this view sustain that a firm whose network ties are 
rich in structural holes is well positioned to cultivate a performance advantage thanks to its 
timely access to information and better control over its partners (Burt, 1992). Several 
empirical studies have shown that firms improve their performance as a result of low density 
in their network (e.g. Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Burt, 2000). Structural holes in the network 
have been associated with higher innovativeness (Zaheer & Bell, 2005) and competitive 
capability development (McEvily & Zaheer, 1999) at the organization level, and with getting 
a promotion (Burt, 1992) and finding a job (Granovetter, 1973) at the individual level of 
analysis. Opposite to the “open network” perspective, the closure argument suggests that 
densely embedded networks with many connections linking ego’s alters are facilitative for 
ego (Coleman, 1988). Several empirical studies have shown a positive relationship between 
interconnectedness and firm performance. Ahuja (2000) found that closure in the technical 
collaboration networks of  U.S. chemical companies increased the number of patents granted 
to them while Ingram and Roberts (2000), in a study of Sydney Hotels, showed that the more 
cohesive the managerial friendship network around a hotel, the higher its economic 
performance.  
 Although both network strategies are conceptually attractive, it appears likely that 
their value in a given circumstance will be contingent on several factors (Ahuja, 2000). 
Accordingly, scholars have started to examine the contingencies, at different levels of 
analysis, under which network options are effective in enhancing firm performance (Rowley 
et al., 2000; Koka & Prescott, 2008). For instance, studying the Canadian investment banking 
industry, Shipilov (2006) provided evidence that, contingent upon firm’s levels of 
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specialization, structural holes are beneficial to firm performance. Conversely, other studies 
have focused on the environmental contingencies suggesting, for example, that the 
relationship between structural holes and firm performance is contingent on the industry 
context (e.g. Pollok, Porak, & Wade, 2004). We complement and extend those studies by 
focusing simultaneously on environmental and firm contingencies to solve this puzzle. 
 We begin our discussion by proposing that the impact of adopting a brokerage strategy 
on a firm’s performance is contingent upon the environmental context, specifically the 
environmental jolt. Turbulent environments, as opposed to more stable ones, pose different 
challenges on managers decision-making processes with the former suggesting a more 
prudent behavior while the latter favoring a more opportunity-seeking posture. When it comes 
to network structuring decisions, environmental jolts may put a premium on those firms that 
reconfigure their network in the most effective way in order to absorb the uncertainties 
generated by the shock and adapt to the new environmental scenario. In times of relative 
tranquility, brokerage may be the preferred strategy in order to obtain information and control 
advantages by building relationships with disconnected alters. Moreover, the exploration of 
new ideas, which intrinsically hides some uncertainties, may be facilitated by a less hostile 
and more munificent environment. We posit that, everything else being equal, firms 
occupying positions rich in structural holes will be able to increase their performance when 
the environment is stable. However, such benefits may not apply when the external conditions 
change dramatically such as in the case of a negative environmental jolt. Jolts have the power 
to break the status quo, redefine the ‘rules of the game’ and render previous strategies 
incompatible with the new scenario. Thus, in conditions of extreme uncertainty stemming 
from the external environment, adopting a brokerage posture could expose a firm to further 
uncertainty. Indeed, brokerage is a more hazardous strategy and requires a greater risk-taking 
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propensity as compared to network closure given also the fact that bridging ties are more 
subject to decay (Burt, 2002). 
 Support for our argument can be found in previous theoretical and empirical 
contributions. For example, Granovetter (1982) has argued that strong ties are more likely to 
be useful to an actor who is in an insecure position. In a similar fashion, Krackhardt (1992) 
asserted that focusing resources on a few philos ties could be the preferred action when the 
ego is facing uncertainty and change. In addition, it has been demonstrated that an increase in 
the level of uncertainty could stress the importance of trusted partners with whom the firm has 
already transacted in the past (Podolny, 1994; Gulati, 1995) or of partners of trusted partners. 
Preferring a trusted partner or looking at the partner’s immediate partners to form an alliance 
would lead to a reinforcement of the existing network structure with the ultimate effect of 
leading to a closer network. Following this logic, we expect that, following an environmental 
jolt, firms that will opt for the safety of network closure will be more able to withstand the 
negative effects of the shock. Network closure will thus act as a ‘shield’ and have a positive 
impact on firm performance. Therefore: 
 
 H1a: Ceteris paribus, brokerage propensity is positively related to performance. 
  
 H1b: Brokerage propensity relates negatively to performance during an 
 environmental jolt. 
 
Firm size 
 Does firm size help to keep up with rapid changes in the external environment? 
Organizational size is one of the dominant variables in the sociological literature on 
organizational structure (see Kimberly, 1976 for a review). Hence, examining its influence on 
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the relationship between structure and performance is a reasonable undertaking. Received 
literature has suggested that achieving large size is beneficial in many ways. A large firm can 
reduce its dependence from direct competitors, suppliers, customers and complementors as 
well as create barriers to entry (Porter, 1999). Large size provides the means for global 
expansion (Henisz &  Delios, 2001) and new market entry (Haveman & Nonnemaker, 2000). 
Large firms are also more likely to innovate (Sorensen & Stuart, 2000).   
 Organizational size is also strongly related to organizational change and to its 
outcomes, which is the focus of this study. Previous literature has produced mixed theoretical 
and empirical arguments on the relationship between organizational size and organizational 
change. In particular, the two prevailing views have argued for a fluidity of size on the one 
hand and for a rigidity of size on the other (Haveman, 1993). Advocates of the first view, 
have found a positive relationship between correlates of size such as structural complexity, 
differentiation, and decentralization with the adoption of innovations (e.g., Moch & Morse, 
1977). Moreover, given that large firms possess more slack resources, they are less likely to 
fail if they undertake change (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). Thus, large organizations are more 
likely than small organizations to complete change successfully once it has begun. The 
rigidity of size argument is related to structural inertia theory which states that inertia 
increases with organizational size. Accordingly, we expect that larger organizations will tend 
to be more resistant to change (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). One of the reasons for such 
rigidity is derived from the increased bureaucratization that large firms face. Bureaucratic 
organizations are characterized by greater formalization of behavior, a more decentralized 
managerial decision-making authority and greater task specialization. A second source of 
rigidity comes from the limited dependence that large firms have on their exchange partners 
which lowers their incentives to adjust these relationships to fit environmental fluctuations 
(Haveman, 1993). All in all, these arguments suggest that large organizations will tend to be 
88 
 
more rigid than smaller organizations. Indeed, previous studies have shown empirically that 
large organizations are less likely to change (e.g., Delacroix & Swaminathan, 1991). 
 The two opposing views on the relationship between organizational size and change 
described above can only be resolved if we consider the organizational context (Haveman, 
1993). Accordingly, we propose that in mature industries, where inertial pressures are strong, 
large organizations will do worse than smaller organizations in adjusting to shifting 
environmental conditions. Vice versa, in younger industries, where inertial pressures are 
expected to be weaker, larger organizations will be more able to keep pace with 
environmental changes.    
 Changes in interorganizational ties can be considered a type of organizational change, 
and, thus, structural inertia in larger organizations may reduce the speed of dissolving old ties 
and establishing new ones in a changing environment (Kim et al., 2006). Following resource-
based logics, we view the firm as a collection of resources. Given that resources play a critical 
role, how brokerage may benefit firm performance also depends on firm size, a commonly 
adopted proxy for firm resources in the organization literature. We believe it is worth 
including firm size in our study as a moderator for at least two reasons: 1) although previous 
studies on interpersonal networks have focused on properties of network members, only a 
limited amount of studies on interorganizational networks have explored this possibility 
(Shipilov, 2006), 2) despite the acknowledged role of firm size on a firm’s ability to grow and 
survive over time, previous research has often treated size as a control variable 
underestimating its importance (Dobrev & Carroll, 2003). As size increases, an organization 
may experience complexity arising from coordinating a large number of units and managing 
hierarchical sets of linkages and relationships among people and units. This increased 
complexity leads to difficulty in reconciling different interests among individuals and groups 
when attempting to find new partners for core activities (Kim et al., 2006). Large firms are 
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also more inert in changing quickly their relationships due to higher path dependence in terms 
of alliance strategy. Furthermore, large organizational size enhances the capacity to withstand 
environmental shocks (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) which diminishes the incentives for drastic 
change – characterized by uncertainty and financial exposure – in favor of a “wait and see” 
approach. Conversely, smaller firms operate near an ‘extinction boundary’, whereby a random 
shock that merely inconveniences a giant organization can destroy a small one (Levinthal, 
1991). Given their limited amount of resources – which also poses challenges in terms of 
partners choice and volume of new alliances they can create – margins for error are small for 
small organizations, especially during a period of extreme instability. Accordingly, we expect 
that in such conditions, smaller firms will proactively search to occupy positions rich in 
structural holes in order to maximize the benefits of brokerage. Taken together these 
arguments lead us to the following:  
 
 H2: Brokerage propensity relates negatively to performance for larger firms during 
 an environmental jolt.  
 
INDUSTRY SETTING 
 “Industries currently in the throes of quantum change include telecommunications, 
financial services, airline transportation, and health care. In each of these settings, 
discontinuous changes are restructuring the industry, relocating its boundaries, and changing 
the bases of competition” (Meyer, Brooks, & Goes, 1990: 93). Two decades have passed 
since these considerations but yet it seems that the airline industry has gone through periods 
of relative tranquility interrupted by shifts of both endogenous (e.g., Open Skies agreements) 
and exogenous (e.g., the Sars epidemic) nature. Consequently, the airline industry appears as 
an appropriate context for our study both because it has witnessed significant strategic 
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changes over the last decades and because interfirm relationships have been an acknowledged 
influence on the industry’s evolution. For example, in 2000 more than 80 percent of global 
airline carriers engaged in some form of alliance (Baker, 2001). The main three multilateral 
airline alliances are Star Alliance, SkyTeam and oneworld which control the 69 percent of 
world revenue passenger kilometers (IATA, 2008). These alliances involve full marketing 
cooperation with respect to frequent flyer programs (FFPs) and promotion (including 
investments in common brand name), besides joint access to airport facilities controlled by 
individual members (Lazzarini, 2007: 347). They also offer comprehensive code-sharing 
agreements involving several routes instead of bilateral agreements comprising few routes 
(Oum & Yu, 1998). 
 The airline industry is characterized by a paradox: although in operational terms is the 
most internationalized, in terms of ownership and control, is largely domestic. Additionally, it 
is a challenging one to analyze given its strict regulation rules and the enormous interest of 
both the public and private sector around it. The competitive pressures coming from an ever 
increasing globalized environment make it difficult for the airlines to recover their full costs. 
Moreover, the financial performance of the industry is strongly correlated with the larger 
business cycle. Thus, the upturns and downturns of the industry are strongly related to the 
changes of external environment. In recent years, a number of events particularly impacted on 
commercial aviation, adding to the normal market uncertainties of the industry and the larger, 
temporal trends that are on-going (Button, 2008). Among them, the terrorist attacks on the US 
in 2000, the SARS epidemic, the second Gulf War and rises in costs of aviation fuel had 
major implications for the global air transportation market. Crises act as catalysts for the 
reshaping of the airline industry both at market and regulatory levels. In this context, given 
the strict regulation that often disallows cross-border mergers, alliances have become the only 
viable way to grow. 
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METHODS 
Data 
 We tested our hypotheses using longitudinal data on alliances formed in the global 
airline industry between 1998 and 2006. We identified an alliance as any durable 
collaborative activity that involved exchange of resources between firms (Ahuja, 2000). All 
airlines that had formed at least one alliance during the period of our study were included in 
the database. Data on airline alliances and their evolution are collected through several issues 
of the Airline Business magazine. These issues contain data on all major forms of cooperative 
relationships (e.g., blocked seat, code-sharing, marketing) but exclude cooperation on 
frequent flyer programs as well as alliances among charter and cargo carriers which are not 
the focus of this study. We used these data to build a series of sociomatrices. A particular 
matrix entry Xij corresponds to an active tie between an airline in row i and an airline in row j. 
Thus, inactive alliances in the study period were excluded. Forming year-wise matrixes is 
necessary in order to create a panel dataset for the purpose of year-wise testing of hypotheses. 
Such approach is also particulary indicated for testing environmental change hypotheses 
(Koka & Prescott, 2008). Information on airlines operations were collected from IATA and 
ICAO statistics. More in deep, data about carriers’ performance and traffic come from the 
World Air Transport Statistics published by the International Air Transport Association and 
Traffic by Flight Stage compiled by the International Civil Aviation Organization. The 
database includes information on individual airlines observed over time. The final sample 
consists of an unbalanced panel of 271 airlines, including companies that have disappeared 
from the business arena and those that were founded during the analysis period, for a total of 
1643 observations. To this day, these carriers represent almost 80 percent of the total world 
passenger traffic, covering more than 80 countries in the world. 
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Variables 
Dependent variable 
 We chose revenue per passenger kilometer (RPK) as the dependent variable to 
measure firm performance as this indicator is commonly used in the airline industry for 
performance measurement. RPK is expressed as the number of revenue passengers carried 
multiplied by the distance flown by carrier i  at year t and is a measure of sales volume of 
passenger traffic. 
 We decided not to employ financial measures for two main reasons. First, both 
academics and policymakers have expressed concern that corporate financial reporting and 
disclosure are not keeping pace with a dynamic and constantly changing business world 
(AICPA, 1994; Wallman, 1995). Since our main interest is in exploring how different 
network strategies impact performance in situations of tranquility and turbulence, we believed 
that such concerns were even more important in our study. Second, using financial 
information for the global airline industry would be problematic since not all carriers are 
publicly traded, and in several cases not even reliable and standardized accounting 
information is available (Lazzarini, 2007). For our purposes, we could have employed 
passenger load factor, measured in revenue passenger kilometer (RPK), to its overall seat 
capacity (ASK). However, in our case the adoption of this measure would have led to 
misleading results. Following environmental jolts such as the September 11 terrorist attacks 
or the more recent Iceland’s volcano eruptions, airlines have proved capable to balance the 
fall of RPKs with a reduction of ASKs. In other words a drastic, although temporary, 
reduction of passenger traffic was compensated with a reduction of capacity. To smooth the 
distribution of the dependent variable we took a log of revenue passenger kilometers when we 
constructed the RPK variable. 
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Independent variables 
 
 Brokerage propensity. Our independent variable, brokerage propensity, measures the 
degree of a carrier’s network openness. To compute this measure, we relied upon Burt’s 
(1992) network constraint. The index C measures the extent to which all of i’s network is 
directly or indirectly invested in its relationship with contact j. Thus, 
 
Cij = pij + pij ( Σq piqpqj ) 2 
 
for q ≠ i, j, where pij is the proportion of i’s relations invested in contact j and the total in 
parentheses is the proportion of i’s relations that are directly or indirectly invested in the 
connection with contact j. Constraint is designed to capture the extent to which the focal 
actor’s network lacks structural holes. The more constrained the actor, the fewer the 
opportunities for action. Because constraint has a range between 0 and 1, to facilitate 
interpretation, we used 1 – constraint to directly measure the number of structural holes 
(Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000; Soda, Usai, & Zaheer, 2004). We employed UCINET VI to 
compute this measure (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). 
 
 Environmental jolt. The dummy variable environmental jolt took the value of 1 for the 
years 2001, 2002, and 2003 and 0 otherwise. Extending the effects of the jolt for a period of 
three years is a judgment based on previous studies (Madhavan et al., 1998; Koka & Prescott, 
2008; Wan & Yiu, 2009) and industry evidence. The global economic downturn that began at 
the end of 2000 with the bursting of the dot.com bubble, continued through 2003. The events 
of September 11, 2001 exacerbated pessimism about the future and spread from the United 
States to other countries as described in business and trade journals (Polzehl, Spokoiny, & 
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Starica, 2004). After 9/11 attacks, global demand for air travel collapsed immediately. The 
downturn of 2001 was perceived as the worst airline crisis ever, resulting in a “perfect storm” 
(Franke & John, 2011). Although people commenced flying shortly after, it was not until 
2004 when pre-jolt demand level was reached. Recovery was also delayed due also to the 
2003 pandemic threat of SARS which further increased our confidence in our 3-year window 
choice.   
 
 Firm size. Larger firms may have more resources and are also likely to make more 
desirable partners (Beckman, Haunschild, & Philips, 2004). Such characteristics might foster, 
under certain circumstances, their ability to innovate and experiment. However, in periods of 
extreme turbulence, large size will be associated with higher conservatism favoring small 
changes, if any, which could ultimately have a negative impact on their performance, at least 
in the short term. Firm size was operationalized as the natural logarithm of the fleet size, 
which is a frequently used indicator for size in the airline industry. Other measures could have 
been used in place of fleet size such as the number of employees, total assets or number of 
clients served. Concern about what measure of size should be used is especially important in 
cross-industry studies (Kimberly, 1976), but for studies confined to a single industry, the 
effects of size can be more easily disentangled (Blau & Schoenherr, 1971).  
 
Control variables 
 Many other factors may influence an airline’s performance. Accordingly, we control 
for a baseline model that includes a range of firm attributes as well as environmental 
characteristics. Unless noted otherwise, the control variables are time varying and lagged one 
year to avoid simultaneity.  
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 Firm-specific attributes. Firms that have been in existence longer are likely to have 
greater market share since they had more time to develop their reputation and put their names 
out to the public, develop relationships with sales representatives, and so on (Zaheer & Bell, 
2005). Accordingly, firm ageit was used to control for possible differences in carriers’ 
experience in the industry (Lazzarini, 2007), measured as the time elapsed, at t since the 
carrier’s founding. In order to capture the network externalities stemming from airlines’ 
membership in the existing constellations, we also controlled  for alliance memberit, a dummy 
that will be equal to 1 if an airline is a member of one of the four constellations in existence 
during our study period (Star Alliance, SkyTeam, oneworld, Qualiflyer) and 0 if the airline is 
not a member of any constellation. Ecology theories predict that age is an important 
determinant of survival with younger organizations assumed to have higher liabilities of 
newness (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Stinchcombe, 1965). To check whether such liabilities 
also hit companies that have less experience in managing alliances, we included alliance 
experienceit, measured as the time elapsed at t since the first alliance agreement signed by the 
carrier i.  
 
 Country-specific attributes. An airline’s size of domestic market appears to have 
significant impact on its performance. Accordingly, we employ a series of country-specific 
controls: country’s per capita GDP (GDPcapit, country’s i GDP per capita in thousands of US 
dollars) and population (Popit, number of inhabitants). These information are obtained from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. Finally, we created a count 
variable, institutional environment, to account for differences within regions for each year. 
Following the classification provided by the Airline Business Magazine we identified six 
main regions: Africa, Asia-Pacific, Central/South America, Europe, Middle East, and North 
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America. All the above measures are calculated for each firm for every year they are in the 
network to enable the longitudinal testing of our hypotheses. 
 
 Year. To control for the possibility that unobserved temporal factors or other 
unspecified events affected the propensity of firms to form or delete ties, for each year, the 
variable year was entered as a continuous variable, and not as a dummy, otherwise we would 
not have been able to estimate the effect of jolts (which is constant for all firms in any given 
year) . 
 
Statistical method 
 We used a panel design on observations running from 1998 to 2006 choosing the firm 
as a unit of analysis. More specifically, we focused on the egocentric network, consisting of 
each individual node, all other which it has relations, and the relations among these nodes. If 
the sample size is N, there are N units of analysis at the ego-centered level. Each actor can be 
described by the number, the magnitude, and other characteristics of its linkages with the 
other actors, for example, the proportion of reciprocated linkages or the density of ties 
between the actors in ego’s first ‘zone’ (that is the set of actors directly connected to ego) 
(Knoke & Kuklinski, 1991). While we are interested in testing our hypotheses at the firm’s 
ego network level, our final goal is to understand how the entire industry’s relationships 
change following an environmental jolt. According to Koka et al. (2006) the macro changes at 
the industry network level are driven by the aggregation of numerous micro changes (changes 
at the firm ego network level), much as the behavior of an overall market rests on the 
individual behaviors of numerous market participants. Thus, we view overall network change 
as resting on the firms’ decision to expand or close their ego networks.  
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To test the previous hypotheses, we estimated a random intercept effects model. The model 
has the following basic form: 
yit = µt + βxit +γzi + αi + it 
Instead of assuming that αi represents a set of fixed parameters as in the fixed-effects model, 
in the random-effects model each αi is a random variable with a specified probability 
distribution. Typically, it is assumed that αi has a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and 
constant variance, and that it is independent of xit, zi and it (Allison, 2005). The final model 
is: 
 
Log (RPK) = αi + β1 (Year) + β2 (Inst. environment) + β3 (Popit) + β4 (GDPcapit) + β5 
(Firm ageit) + β6 (Alliance experienceit) + β7 (Alliance memberit) + β8 (Firm sizeit) 
+ β9 (Jolt) + β10 (Brokerageit-1) + β11 (Brokerageit-1 * jolt) + β12 (Brokerageit-1* jolt 
* Firm sizeit) + εit 
 
 In the analysis, we reported significance levels based on Huber-White robust standard 
errors to control for any residual heteroskedasticity across panels. We obtained our estimates 
using PROC MIXED in SAS (version 9.1). 
 As an exogenous shock, the September 11 (also known as “9/11”) terrorist attacks of 
2001 provided us with a natural experiment to test our hypotheses. The term natural 
experiment, also known as quasi-experiment, suggests that this study is an experiment and 
moreover that is spontaneous. Accordingly, we are interested in the variation in the group of 
airlines in the sample before, during and after the treatment (the environmental jolt in our 
case). We used dummy variables to code the three periods, with the jolt (2001-2003) as the 
reference period, and interacted the period dummy variables with the independent variables. 
Finding statistical significance of the interaction coefficients would indicate that the 
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relationship differs between the jolt and the pre-jolt (1998-2000) and the post-jolt (2004-
2006) periods (Wan & Yiu, 2009). 
 
RESULTS 
 Table 3 is a matrix of the correlations, means, and standard deviations of the variables 
that we used in our analysis. The average airline had been in business for nearly forty years 
but has only eleven years of experience in managing alliances which means that although the 
airline industry is a relatively mature one, it is still young in terms of alliance networks.  For 
the full panel across all three time periods in the study, both firm size (r = 0.88, p < 0.001) and 
brokerage (r = 0.37, p < 0.001) positively and significantly correlate with performance. 
Significant positive correlations existed also between firm size and brokerage (r = 0.30, p < 
0.001). We assessed multicollinearity by regressing each of the variables against all other 
explanatory variables and then calculating a variance inflation factor (VIF), measured as one 
over the difference between one and R2. While there is no formal cutoff value for determining 
presence of multicollinearity, statisticians sometimes suggest 2 as a threshold level above 
which one should be concerned. As displayed in Table 3, we found no variables to violate 
such level.  
 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
--------------------------------- 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
--------------------------------- 
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 Table 4 reports the main results of the unbalanced panel data analysis that we 
employed to test and compare the hypothesized relationships between the jolt and the non-jolt 
periods. Model 1 presents the results for the baseline model. Size has a statistically 
significant, positive relationship with performance (model 1: β= 14493, p < 0.001) whereas 
jolt shows a significant, negative association with performance (model 1: β= -1066.51, p < 
0.05). Model 2 introduces the brokerage variable, testing our Hypothesis 1a, which predicts 
that everything else being equal, brokerage is positively related to firm performance. 
Brokerage has a positive and significant relationship with performance (model 2: β= 2643.34, 
p < 0.05). Hypothesis 1a receives support. 
 In the second step, we entered the two-way interaction term to test our contingency 
hypothesis. Hypothesis 1b predicts that brokerage negatively relates to performance during an 
environmental jolt. As shown in model 3, the interactive effect of brokerage and jolt on 
performance is negative and significant (model 3: β= -5369.97, p < 0.01). Thus, hypothesis 1b 
receives support. 
 In the third and final step, we entered the three-way interaction term to test our 
Hypothesis 2 which predicts that larger firms that act also as brokers will show a performance 
decrease during the jolt period. The coefficient for the three-way interaction is negative and 
statistically significant (model 4: β= -4428.5, p < 0.001). Hypothesis 2 is strongly supported. 
The overall fit of the model improves substantially as compared to the baseline but also with 
respect to Model 2 and Model 3, as indicated by the change in the value of the -2 Log 
Likelihood and the other statistics. With respect to the baseline model, for example, the LR 
test ( χ2 [L4-L1 = 3576 with p < 0.001 for 3 d.f.) and the AIC test (21239.6 vs. 17673.6) show 
a significant improvement.    
 We tested the robustness of the results to alternative model specifications. First, to 
ensure that there was no bias in the validity of the results, we estimated the random effects 
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model using the Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE). In the case of linear models, GEE 
is equivalent to generalized least squares (Allison 2005). The GEE method makes no explicit 
assumptions about random components in the regression model, but simply allows for 
correlation in the dependent variable across observations over time. We assumed this 
correlation to be equal across time using an exchangeable correlation structure (Liang & 
Zeger 1986). It is worth noting that the GEE coefficients are population averaged (i.e., they 
describe what happens to the whole population, not a particular individual, if everyone’s 
predictor values are increased by one unit). The results for the GEE model turned out to be 
qualitatively similar to those for the random intercept model and are available from the 
authors upon request. Second, we compared the results with those for the fixed effects model 
to verify whether unobserved heterogeneity might be a problem in our analysis. The 
coefficient estimates were obtained by using PROC GLM in SAS. Since the fixed effects 
approach controls for the impact of all stable factors that do not vary over time, our results 
estimate the influence of the variable of theoretical interest after firm level time-varying and 
time-invariant attributes are accounted for. The coefficient estimates for the fixed effects 
regression model are qualitatively similar to those obtained for the random intercept model, as 
can be observed in the last column of table 4. 
 We also ran the analysis using a different specification for our dependent variable. 
Following prior research that suggests the adoption of net income as a proxy for an airline’s 
financial performance, we created the variable Net incomeit rather than using our operational 
performance measure. Again, the results of this additional set of analyses did not vary 
appreciably from those presented here. 
 Finally, we re-estimated our models adopting other measures of brokerage than 
constraint. In a separate set of analyses, we used Burt’s (1992: 54) Effective Size as an 
alternative measure of brokerage. This measure represents the difference between the number 
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of a firm’s partners and the average number of ties among them, not counting their ties to the 
firm itself. The results were consistent with our prior findings. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Despite growing and continuous interest in interfirm networks, the link between a 
firm’s position in an alliance network and its performance remains poorly understood and 
subject to debate (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Baum et al., 2000; Shipilov, 2006). Mixed results from 
empirical studies have further accentuated the need to better understand this relationship. 
More recently, consensus has been reached about the contingent nature of benefits that firms 
can obtain by occupying positions rich in structural holes but the question of the specific 
contingencies that have performance implications for a firm’s ego network structure have not 
received an answer yet (Shipilov, 2009). 
 Our results provide evidence that the ability of firms to benefit from their positions 
within networks is contingent upon environmental and firm attributes. We identify and 
empirically assess the impact of environmental jolts and firm size on the relationship between 
network flexibility and firm performance. In line with previous theoretical and empirical 
contributions, we find that, everything else being equal, structural holes increase firm 
performance. A network of many non redundant contacts is the ideal locus in which to obtain 
valuable information from a diverse group of  partners and arbitrage opportunities via the 
tertius gaudens strategy. Moreover, this finding is also supported by recent considerations on 
brokerage in the airline industry which suggest that firms that occupy structural holes will 
receive the highest returns (Gudmundsson & Lechner, 2006). However, a strong limit to this 
finding is the assumption of equilibrium over time. Our results illustrate that the external 
environment, and more notably the changes in it, can condition significantly the positive 
relationship between brokerage and performance. Specifically, we find that in periods of 
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turmoil triggered by external shocks brokerage produces a negative impact on performance 
whereas network closure is beneficial. A network composed of partners with many redundant 
ties may be useful from the firm’s perspective when it and its partners are faced with a 
common external threat (Ahuja, 2000) such as in the case of an environmental jolt. In other 
words, in conditions of extreme uncertainty stemming from the external environment, the 
adoption of a more conservative posture is a form of threat-rigidity response (Staw 
Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). Instead of investing resources in more uncertain relationships 
such as bridging ties, opting for closure will bring better stability increasing a firm’s chances 
of ‘weathering the storm’ and eventually accumulating some slack that may be used to 
configure a more open network once the crisis period is over.  Finally, we find evidence for a 
rigidity of size for brokers when the environment is unstable. We will discuss this argument in 
more detail in the next paragraphs. 
 This study contributes to the network literature in several ways. First, in prior research 
related to network changes, scholars have largely focused on the endogenous influence of the 
network structure in which the firm is embedded in affecting the opportunities available to the 
firm to strategically position itself within the network (Koka et al., 2006) disregarding the role 
of the external environment. The limited amount of studies focusing on events as occasions 
for network restructuring has examined only events taking place inside the industry 
boundaries (e.g., Madhavan et al., 1998) which we have defined as endogenous jolts. In this 
paper, we have tried to extend this line of inquiry by focusing on exogenous jolts as a main 
driver of network restructuring and by looking at the performance implications of such 
changes. 
 Second, to address the theoretical puzzle regarding the optimal choice between 
network closure and openness we followed recent trends suggesting the adoption of a 
contingency approach. However, from our scanning of the literature, we recognized that even 
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studies that have adopted contingency-based arguments, have considered the two strategies as 
mutually exclusive implying more or less implicitly that they could not both be enacted in a 
firm’s life. However, we believe that even inside the industry context there is not one optimal 
strategy to follow at all times. Accordingly, we have suggested that one way to solve the 
puzzle is to take into account the contingency of time. Different time periods pose different 
challenges and the firms that will be able to keep the pace of time will have greater chances of 
surviving and prospering over time. In our study, we demonstrated how both closure and 
brokerage strategies can enhance firm performance but at different points in time. This point 
is of particular importance since pursuing both strategies at the same time could increase the 
chance of being “stuck in the middle” (Porter, 1980). 
 Another important aspect of this study is the emphasis posed on firm size. Although 
there is ample consensus on how much size matters for a company’s growth, most papers 
have treated size as a control variable underestimating its relevance. We believe that in studies 
using a network approach, size can be a very important predictor of a firm’s ability to design 
and orchestrate its network. As expected, size is beneficial for a carrier’s performance. In a 
troubled industry such as the airline industry where challenges to profitability are very strong, 
size can bring the benefits of scale and scope that can partly lower the excessive costs airlines 
have to face (e.g., mixed fleet, revenue management and brand building). A bigger airline 
would be also able to serve a larger pool of customers through its route network or to attract 
complementary partners to extend its services. Moreover, a large firm’s greater power may let 
it impose unfavorable conditions of cooperation upon its allies. Lacking the ability to 
coordinate their actions against the large firm, its disconnected partners may agree to the 
imposed terms which could ultimately enhance the large firm performance (Shipilov, 2006). 
We empirically demonstrated that the benefits of brokerage for a large firm hold in a stable 
environment but not during a crisis period.  The instability created by the jolt will partly 
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disrupt a large airline’s status quo putting it in a less secure position if it adopts a brokerage 
strategy. On the contrary, smaller firms may have an incentive to take advantage of the 
window of opportunity created by the jolt in order to reinforce their position. To do so, they 
might be successful in breaking some of the previous ties with larger companies to establish 
new ones that are more advantageous to them. For example, two relatively small airlines, 
TAP Air Portugal and LOT Polish airlines, have been successful in enacting the 
aforementioned strategy. Both carriers were significantly tied to Swissair through direct ties, 
equity stakes and membership in the same multilateral alliance, the Qualiflyer Group. 
Following the events of September 11th, both TAP and LOT took advantage of Swissair’s 
crisis and broke their ties with Swissair while forming new alliances with other significant 
carriers such as Lufthansa which eventually led both TAP and LOT to join the Star Alliance.    
 This study moves beyond research focusing on contingencies at one level of analysis. 
The vast majority of previous studies has focused either on environmental (e.g., Ahuja, 2000) 
or firm level (e.g., Shipilov, 2009) contingencies in examining the relationship between a 
firm’s position in the alliance network and its performance. We enrich and extend previous 
contributions by incorporating contingencies at both levels. Although some studies on 
interpersonal networks have successfully undertaken this path (e.g., Cattani & Ferriani, 2008), 
studies on interfirm networks have seldom explored this possibility. A key strength of the 
network approach is its potential for multilevel analysis. Multilevel models provide a deeper, 
richer portrait of organizational phenomena and allow more integrated inquiry (Klein, Tosi, & 
Cannella, 1999). Thus, we see this analytical approach as particularly promising. 
 The results also suggest that networks change over time following a non linear pattern. 
We suggest that networks evolve according to a punctuated equilibrium in which there may 
be discrete stages that occur due to discontinuous changes in the environment. Although the 
punctuated equilibrium model has been successfully utilized to explain organizational change, 
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our study is the first to use this model to theoretically explain and empirically test network 
change and its implications for performance. Future studies may replicate this study in other 
industries to scrutinize the environmental, network and firm effects on patterns of network 
change. 
 An important empirical contribution this study makes is the use of a natural 
experiment. While natural experiments hold great potential to enhance our understanding of 
strategic management, researchers rarely employ them (Park & Mezias, 2005). Our study 
provides a valuable starting point for future research on how network changes may impact 
performance adopting a natural experiment approach.  
 
Managerial implications 
 Results from this study have also important managerial implications. Faced with 
increasingly challenging environments, alliance managers would like to have a clearer 
understanding of the benefits they can reap from their alliance networks. In other words, the 
challenge for managers is not only to choose with whom to form an alliance, but also to 
design a network that proves to be effective as a whole. Thus, they have to take into account 
both the dyadic and the whole aspects of their networks. Data from the global airline industry 
show that different network configurations produce different performance results.  
Managers have various alliance design choices. The strategic design of alliance networks 
focuses their attention on asking: 1) what types of benefits do we want to obtain from our 
alliance network, 2) are we interested in building networks that enable trust but limit the 
inflow of diverse and fresh insights or are we more interested in networks that provide 
information benefits but inhibit trust development? These choices have important 
implications, at least for performance. 
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 Moreover, not only different types of network positions affect performance 
differentially, it is also important to establish “when” to choose one network strategy or the 
other. As our results demonstrate, network strategies that do not fit environmental and 
organizational requirements can be detrimental to performance. For managers seeking to build 
effective alliance networks, this study may suggest that there is no optimal way suitable for all 
times but rather “many better ways”, the choice of which rests primarily on both 
environmental and organizational requirements in a particular moment. Finally, given the 
unpredictable nature of jolts, it is relevant to build networks that have enough flexibility to 
adjust and keep pace with environmental changes.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 This study is not without limitations. Its results are confined to a single industry which 
pose limits to their generalizability to other contexts. However, our study is one of the few 
focusing on an industry at a global level while most of the studies are usually confined to 
single country or continent. Despite that, the airline industry is a mature context and is a 
service industry too. Less bureaucratic or younger industries as well as manufacturing 
industries could show different patterns of network change with different implications for 
performance. 
 Another limitation of this study which could be addressed in future studies is that it 
focuses only on horizontal alliances among airlines. Exploring other types of relationships, 
such as vertical alliances (e.g., buyer-supplier relationships) or interlocking directorates, could 
shed additional light on the performance implications of choosing alternative network 
strategies. Moreover, our study is limited to the exploration of network change within the 
industry but it would be interesting to explore if and how ties change between cross-industry 
networks following environmental jolts. In studying the moderating role of environment- and 
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firm- level factors on the relationship between firm network position and performance, we 
chose environmental jolt and firm size for the reasons explained in previous sections. 
However, other environmental dimensions and firm-level factors may moderate this 
relationship. Examples of such factors could be environmental munificence and complexity at 
the environmental level and absorptive capacity and geographic scope at the firm level. 
Accordingly, more research is needed encompassing multilevel factors as intervening 
variables affecting the network position – performance relationship.  
 Moreover, our study is limited to the analysis of the consequences of network change 
without looking at its antecedents. Research on the organization and environment-level 
conditions that predict firms’ propensities to modify their networks and the consequences of 
such actions,  could begin to explore two-stage models.   
 Finally, the results we present are limited to a single environmental jolt as an occasion 
for restructuring. Following the classification of jolts provided in this paper, future research 
may give new insights on how and if different types of jolts modify alliance networks and 
with which impact on performance. 
In summary, bridging the literatures on strategic fit and networks, we hypothesized and 
confirmed that environmental jolts and firm size significantly moderate the relationship 
between interfirm networks and performance. We hope our study encourages scholars to 
incorporate environmental and organizational conditions into future research. Further 
theoretical and empirical efforts replicating this approach have great potential to make 
important contributions to strategic management research.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table 1. Summary of the theoretical model 
 
Hypothesis 
 
Feature on an open 
network 
 
Theoretical constructs 
moderating the 
relationship between 
network openness and 
performance 
 
Factors 
represented by 
these constructs 
1b Match with the external environment Environmental jolts 
Extreme changes 
in the external 
environment 
2 
 
Resource base 
 
Firm size Investment ability in network design 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. A taxonomy of environmental jolts 
 
 
 Incumbents ability to generate/influence a disruptive event 
 Strong/Present Moderate/Absent 
In
du
st
ry
 B
ou
nd
ar
ie
s 
O
ut
sid
e 
- Exogenous Jolt 
In
sid
e 
Endogenous Jolt Endogenous Jolt 
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Table 3. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 
 Variables Mean S.D. V.I.F. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 RPK (logged)  20172.5 34030.44 - 1.00           
2 Year 2002.13 2.49 1.12 0.08 1.00          
3 Inst environment 3.66 1.5 1.83 0.17 0.00 1.00         
4 Population 206751.98 358813.23 1.28 0.02 0.02 -0.21  1.00        
5 GDPcap 19208.01 15558.44 2.00 0.26 0.19 0.66 -0.26 1.00       
6 Firm age  37.96 23.91 1.41 0.36 0.02 -0.05 -0.26 -0.02 1.00      
7 Alliance experience 11.01 8.77 1.36 0.30 0.08 -0.10 -0.15 -0.08 0.45 1.00     
8 Alliance member 0.15 0.36 1.49 0.48 0.03 0.02 -0.11 0.12 0.44 0.31 1.00    
9 Firm size (logged) 66.24 97.2 1.69 0.88 -0.00 0.34 0.06 0.31 0.29 0.17 0.38 1.00   
10 Jolt 0.36 0.48 1.02 -0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.06 -0.06 0.04 -0.00 -0.03 1.00  
11 Brokerage 0.45 0.3 1.4 0.38 0.01 0.06 -0.06 0.02 0.32 0.37 0.38 0.30 -0.00 1.00 
 
N= 1643. Correlations larger than +0.13 or smaller than −0.13 are statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
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Table 4. Results using random and fixed effects models 
  Random effects Random effects Random effects Random effects Fixed effects 
Variables Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   
  Coeff. Std Err Coeff. Std Err Coeff. Std Err Coeff. Std Err Coeff. Std Err 
Intercept 1739407*** 431756 749283 507474 756723 504722 858694† 498569   
Year  -899.15*** 215.97 -383.94 254.87 -387.24 253.48 -440.99† 250.42 -1949.11** 637.7  
Inst. Environment 1 -554.41 8667.5 -25940** 10010 -26504** 9948.19 -25398** 9762.63 Yes  
Inst. Environment 2 11198** 4927.89 -25242*** 7434.42 -25037*** 7387.37 -23988*** 7252.55 Yes  
Inst. Environment 3 4505.95 7564.69 -21191* 9266.82 -21608* 9208.21 -20771* 9035.56 Yes  
Inst. Environment 4 3612.01 4466.06 -26706*** 6848.14 -27084*** 6805.34 -26091*** 6679.45 Yes  
Inst. Environment 5 -1609.2 8415.6 -28593** 9829.84 -28656*** 9765.71 -27086** 9582.23 Yes  
Inst. Environment 6 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -   
Popit 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.007† 0.004 
Gdpcapit 0.35*** 0.08 0.292*** 0.083 0.2848*** 0.082 0.3068*** 0.082 0.294*** 0.088 
Firm ageit 58.03 68.57 -244.8** 83.53 -236.35** 83.09 -196.95* 82.279 -786.65*** 154.09 
Alliance experienceit 1536.43*** 203.35 1367*** 231.4 1359.02*** 230.08 1329.73*** 226.28 3513.59*** 600.7 
Alliance memberit 2528.26** 1086.66 1707.21† 1024.5 1707.21† 1025.5 1727.1† 0.023 1101.29 1018.91 
Sizeit 14493*** 1074.92 14927*** 1140.1 14917*** 1135.5 15548*** 1136.9 12718*** 1303.34  
Jolt -1066.51* 545.43 -1282* 530.23 -3450.43*** 936.16 -2189.58* 991.36 -2144.81* 977.65 
Brokerageit   2643.34* 1590.22 2643.34* 1594.15 2443.34 1599.15 2288 1701 
Brokerageit x Jolt     -5369.97** 1913.58 -18182*** 3928.61 -13660*** 3981.39 
Brokerageit x Jolt x Sizeit       -4428.5*** 1189.5 -3246.7** 1199.02 
-2 Log Likelihood -21235.6  -17724.1  -17699.3  -17659.6     
AIC (smaller is better) 21239.6  17728.1  17703.3  17673.6     
AICC (smaller is better) 21239.6  17728.1  17703.3  17673.6     
BIC (smaller is better) 21246.1   17734.1   17709.3   17679.6       
R2         0.97  
N = 1643. † p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 – Standard Errors are heteroskedastic-consistent (“robust”)
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The last decades have witnessed a proliferation of studies using the word “network”. 
Research on individuals as well as studies focusing on firms have explored the reasons and 
the consequences of forming ties of different types from marriage linkages for interpersonal 
ties to joint ventures for interorganizational ties. In other words, the focus has shifted from a 
single unit to the relations formed by these units. Besides this positive aspect, there has been a 
general confusion on how different scholars have defined their networks. In this research I 
tried to follow the orthodox definition of networks, a set of nodes/actors linked through some 
sort of ties. Given that this area of research is still under development, clarity is fundamental 
when defining concepts and methodologies. In the case of networks, there is still a vivid 
debate on whether it is appropriate to use the term network theory or to refer to a relational 
approach. Thus, if we are to move from an approach to a theory of networks it is important to 
adopt a common definition of networks. 
 Networks are a very powerful instrument in the hands of researchers as they can 
provide immediate access to multiple levels of analysis (i.e, the ego, the dyad, the triad, the 
small world, and the whole network). Despite that, much of the literature has emphasized 
dyadic considerations focusing for example on single strategic alliances instead of focusing 
on alliance constellations. To that respect, the adoption of a multilevel perspective has been 
frequently encouraged in the organization and management field and this thesis is a 
theoretical and empirical attempt to answer this need. 
 Another important aspect characterizing research related to interpersonal and 
interorganizational ties is the stability assumption. Cross-sectional studies may give an exact 
picture of the situation in a specific moment but do not help in the understanding of the 
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dynamics characterizing the actors and their ties. Often, it takes a substantial amount of time 
and effort to develop trust in relationships with new partners. Accordingly, studies that  
explore the development of interorganizational ties can also be a useful example for managers  
engaging in alliance portfolio building and restructuring activities. Yet, empirical research on 
network dynamics has been quite sparse. A variety of obstacles such as obtaining longitudinal 
network data and the complexities of handling networks over time have limited our 
understanding of how networks emerge and evolve over time. This thesis proposes to advance 
our understanding of network evolution, and its causes, as well as its consequences by 
offering a theoretical framework and empirical evidence that investigate both the role of 
changes in the external environment and of firm attributes on patterns of network change. 
This effort is part of a general tendency in network research that encourages investigations of 
temporal sequences, path dependencies, and evolutionary patterns.  
 Throughout this manuscript, particular emphasis is given to unexpected events, the 
environmental jolts, that act as catalysts for change. Environmental shocks have become an 
increasingly rare phenomenon in the business world and as management researchers we need 
to provide some answers, where possible, on exit strategies from situations of deep crisis and 
uncertainty.  
 I hope this study encourages further research on the evolution and the dynamics of 
interorganizational networks by paying more attention to situations far from equilibrium of 
both exogenous and endogenous nature using longitudinal datasets and innovative tools. 
 
 
 
 
 
